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Abstract 
Information security in the form of IT governance is part of corporate governance. Corporate 
governance requires that structures and processes are in place with appropriate checks and 
balances to enable directors to discharge their responsibilities. Accordingly, information 
security must be treated in the same way as all the other components of corporate 
governance. This includes making information security a core part of executive and board 
responsibilities.   
Critically, corporate governance requires proper checks and balances to be established in an 
organisation; consequently, these must be in place for all information security 
implementations. In order to achieve this, it is important to have the involvement of three 
key role players, namely information security professionals, ICT security auditors and 
regulatory officials (from now on these will be referred to collectively as the ‘role players’). 
These three role players must ensure that any information security controls implemented 
are properly checked and evaluated against the organisation’s strategic objectives and 
regulatory requirements. 
While maintaining their individual independence, the three role players must work together 
to achieve their individual goals with a view to, as a collective, contributing positively to the 
overall information security of an organisation. Working together requires that each role 
player must clearly understand its individual role, as well the role of the other players at 
different points in an information security programme. In a nutshell, the role players must 
be aligned such that their involvement will deliver maximum value to the organisation. This 
alignment must be based on a common framework which is understood and accepted by all 
three role players.  
This study proposes a South African Information Security Alignment (SAISA) framework to 
ensure the alignment of the role players in the implementation and evaluation of 
information security controls. The structure of the SAISA framework is based on that of the 
COBIT 4.1 (Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology). Hence, the SAISA 
framework comprises four domains, namely, Plan and Organise Information Security (PO-IS), 
Acquire and Implement Information Security (AI-IS), Deliver and Support Information 
Security (DS-IS) and Monitor and Evaluate Information Security (ME-IS). 
     
     
The SAISA framework brings together the three role players with a view to assisting them to 
understand their respective roles, as well as those of the other role players, as they 
implement and evaluate information security controls. The framework is intended to 
improve cooperation among the role players by ensuring that they view each other as 
partners in this process. Through the life cycle structure it adopts, the SAISA framework 
provides an effective and efficient tool for rolling out an information security programme in 
an organisation.  
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1.1 Introduction 
 
Information security has become a matter for consideration at the top level of organisations. 
This is as a result of the increasing risks inherent in, and the rising expenditure on, 
organisational resources for information security. This has been brought about by 
increasingly stringent regulations and growing liabilities in case of compromise of 
information (IT Governance Institute 2006).  In order for information security to be visible to 
the top-level management of the organisation, it should form part of corporate governance 
through its integration into strategy, concept, design and implementation, as well as its 
operation (IT Governance Institute 2006). Corporate governance can be loosely described as 
involving the establishment of the structures and processes, accompanied by the 
appropriate checks and balances that enable directors to discharge their legal 
responsibilities (King 2009).  
Good corporate governance prescribes that the overall corporation is to be transparent, 
with processes, checks and balances in place that ensure good financial reporting; therefore 
information security processes should display similar transparency (Loyd 2004). Key to this is 
the presence of clearly defined roles and responsibilities in the security administration 
process (Nanggroe 2011). These clearly defined roles and responsibilities are central to the 
concept of separation of duties, that is, that security is enhanced by the division of 
responsibilities in the production cycle (Nanggroe 2011, Tipton, Krause 2004). Accordingly, it 
is important that the individual roles and responsibilities of information security are clearly 
communicated and understood (Nanggroe 2011).  
Information security professionals design, implement and maintain information security 
controls in an organisation (ISACA 2007). Such professionals are the first role players forming 
part of this study. Subsequently, the information security controls implemented in an 
organisation must be reviewed by an independent party in a form of an ICT security auditor 
(Loyd 2004). ICT security auditors form the second group of role players that are examined in 
this research. Consequently, the design and implementation of information security controls 
must be built on a solid understanding of the pertinent legal and regulatory requirements 
and restrictions (ISACA 2007). These regulatory requirements are overseen by a body of 
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regulatory officials that seeks compliance either on a voluntary or a mandatory basis, using 
a set of laws, rules, regulations or codes (King 2009). These regulatory officials form the third 
set of role players being examined in this study. 
The three role players need to have a sound understanding of the various factors that have 
implications on information security. Critically, they need to bear in mind that information 
security, through corporate and IT governance, is the responsibility of both the executive 
and the board of an organisation. Accordingly, its evaluation must be elevated to the level of 
a business issue, rather than being regarded as merely a technical issue (and left to the IT 
technicians). As a business issue, it should be dealt with at all levels of the organisation (Von 
Solms 2006). This also requires that information security related activities should be treated 
in the same way as any other business-critical activity, that is, they must be thoroughly 
planned for, effectively executed and constantly monitored at the highest levels of the 
organisation (IT Governance Institute 2008). Proper management of information security 
involves adequate risk management, reporting and accountability (IT Governance Institute 
2006). 
Information security is a complex subject and implementing the controls involved in an 
organisation is not an easy exercise (ISACA 2009a, Trcek 2003, Von Solms, Von Solms 2004). 
Information security is a combination of technical, administrative and physical controls 
(Cunningham et al. 2005, Pfleeger, Pfleeger 2002). Technical controls include controls such 
as firewalls, antivirus programs and encryption. Administrative controls, on the other hand, 
include those such as policies, standards and user awareness, while physical controls include 
controls such as biometrics and access cards (Harris 2005).  
Information security is, therefore, a multidimensional discipline (Von Solms 2001). Other 
than the corporate governance dimension, it also includes the legal, the 
measurement/metrics (compliance monitoring/real time audit) and the audit dimensions 
(Von Solms 2001). Each role player thus plays a part in each of the information security 
dimensions in a greater or lesser way. 
Implementing information security controls requires resources in the form of financial, 
human and time, among others (Anderson, Choobineh 2008, Powner 2005). These resources 
are of a limited nature and, as a result, information security programmes must compete with 
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other business requirements for the same resources. Some of the business requirements are 
for income generation and, understandably, business executives may be biased towards 
activities that have the potential to improve the organisation’s bottom line (Anderson, 
Choobineh 2008). However, the organisation may pay a huge price for ignoring information 
security; for example, if the organisation were to become a victim of a security breach, it 
might suffer financial loss, theft or damage to information, loss of image and reputation, as 
well as legal action (Hermason, Hill & Ivancevich 2000, Humphreys 2008). 
It is important for executives and boards of directors to understand and appreciate the 
importance of information security. Accordingly, information security professionals need to 
help executives understand this importance. Key to this is for information security 
professionals to have good communication skills that enable them to communicate at all 
levels of the organisation (Tipton, Krause 2004). Nevertheless, despite the fact that 
communication is an important tool, it is in no way the only skill that information security 
officials should possess. Other important skills include technical skills, business knowledge, 
legal awareness and organisational processes (Sundt 2006). This therefore highlights how 
complex the work of the information security professional is. 
Similar challenges are experienced by ICT security auditors. These professionals are the ‘eyes 
and ears’ of management, in that they measure and report on the information security 
position of the organisation (Wright 2008). ICT security auditors need to understand the 
environment (internal control model of the organisation) being audited in order to be able 
to voice opinions that are relevant and useful to the organisation (ISACA 2008a). Once the 
internal control model has been established, the auditor will be in a better position to 
proceed with the test for compliance to the model (ISACA 2008a).  
In order for auditors to establish an internal control model, they must interview the 
managers of the organisation and go through written descriptions and flowcharts of the 
organisation’s systems and processes (Bailey 1979). For large corporations, information 
received by the auditor, while trying to establish and identify any weakness in the model, 
may be too much (Bailey 1979). Furthermore, as enterprise systems (to be audited) are 
large, complex and physically distributed (Zimmermann 2009), in order for an auditor to be 
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able to understand, comprehend and audit these complex models and systems they must 
possess appropriate business skills and relevant experience (Zimmermann 2009). 
The third role player that this research examines is the regulatory officials (regulators). 
Regulators are concerned about the extent to which the organisation complies with 
regulatory requirements. These requirements could be the laws of the country in which the 
organisation is operating, for example licensing issues, or could be industry-specific 
regulations applicable to the industry in which the organisation is operating, such as codes, 
practices and standards. Apart from financial risk and other corporate risks, regulators are 
specifically concerned about operational and systemic risk, within which technology risk and 
information security issues reside (IT Governance Institute 2006). As such, information 
technology is the foundation and facilitator of the operational risk management framework 
(IT Governance Institute 2007b). 
Effective oversight of compliance requires the establishment of a review process to ensure 
compliance with laws, regulations and contractual requirements. This process includes 
identifying compliance requirements, optimising and evaluating the response, obtaining 
assurance that the requirements have been complied with and, finally, integrating IT 
compliance reporting with the rest of the business (Liell-Cook, Graham & Hill 2009).  
Clearly the three role players have a huge role play in the implementation and evaluation of 
information security controls. While the information security professionals must play a role 
of implementing controls, ICT security auditors are there to provide independent review of 
the implemented controls. Regulatory officials exist to ensure that the applicable laws and 
regulations with regard to information security are complied with.   
For each role player to effectively and efficient execute their responsibilities it is important 
that they must work together, not against each other. One way of fostering the cooperation 
among the role players is the use of a common reference with regard to implementation and 
evaluation of information security controls. Such a framework must guide the three role 
players in terms of the implementation and evaluation of the information security controls 
in an organisation. The adoption of a framework contributes to the quick implementation of 
good practices and avoids lengthy delays in creating and agreeing on new approaches that 
simply reinvent the wheel (IT Governance Institute 2008a). A framework also helps to ensure 
  Introduction 
Chapter 1  14   
that the implementers of information security controls (information security professionals) 
and the evaluators/assessors (ICT security auditors and regulatory officials) are better 
aligned.  
1.2 Why The Three Role Players Were Chosen For This 
Study? 
 
The individuals delegated the responsibility for implementing and maintaining security by 
senior management are information security professionals (Nanggroe 2011). They therefore 
have a very important role to play in ensuring that both the executive management and the 
board are able to discharge their duties pertaining to information security. According to a 
recent Frost and Sullivan research report, the top five most time-consuming activities for 
information security professionals include meeting regulatory compliance and auditing IT 
security compliance (Ayoub 2011). This therefore shows that regulatory compliance and IT 
security auditing are critical matters for information security professionals.  
ICT security auditors have a crucial role to play in information security. They achieve this by 
conducting regular, independent audits and by providing reports to senior management on 
the effectiveness of security controls (Nanggroe 2011). In addition, they ascertain whether 
security policies, standards, guidelines, and procedures effectively comply with the 
company’s stated security objectives (Nanggroe 2011). For these reasons information 
security professionals and ICT regulatory auditors were included for investigation in this 
study. 
Adherence to the law and regulatory controls is the foundation or baseline upon which an 
information security programme must be built (Wright 2008). At a minimum, it is necessary 
to adhere to the requirements imposed by law on the organisation (Wright 2008). 
Compliance to legal and regulatory requirements by the organisation is not an option, but a 
critical part of the information security programme. It is, therefore, important for an 
organisation to identify a role that is responsible for reviewing the organisation’s 
information security policies and standards in terms of legal and regulatory compliance and 
enforceability (Tipton, Krause 2004). In a recent survey conducted by the Information 
Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA), regulatory compliance was identified as the 
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number one concern for information security professionals and auditors (ISACA 2011b). 
External regulatory officials can perform inspections on organisations to verify compliance 
with the applicable legal and regulatory requirements. The role of these regulatory officials 
can never be overstated; hence, they have been included in this study. 
1.3 Problem statement 
 
The three role players have a similar goal in mind, that is, to assist organisations in 
implementing the necessary information security controls and, as a result, protecting the 
organisation’s information assets. This contributes to ensuring that the interests of the 
various organisational stakeholders (e.g. customers and shareholders) are properly 
protected. While the role players’ ultimate goal may be the same, their roles and 
responsibilities are distinct and different.  
Notwithstanding the difference in roles and responsibilities of the role players, the nature of 
their work requires them to interact with each other at various stages of the information 
security programme. The challenge, however, is the lack of alignment among them in 
relation to the implementation and evaluation of information security controls as each role 
player has its own approach and standards when implementing and evaluating information 
security controls (Tipton, Krause 2004, ISACA 2009a, National Computing Centre 2005).  
It would appear that there are differences between what information security professionals 
implement and what ICT security auditors assess as they conduct their audits. This can be 
attributed to many challenges, including communication gaps, hidden checklists, and a 
failure to collaborate on control assessment and control improvement (National Computing 
Centre 2005). This, then, results in the wastage of resources (money and time) through 
disagreements and back-and-forth discussions regarding what information security 
professionals believe are the correct controls to be implemented versus the findings made 
by the ICT security auditors. 
As part of implementing information security controls, organisations should also observe 
and incorporate the legal requirements applicable to their environment. This, however, 
comes with its own challenges. Since information security professionals are not legal experts 
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it is difficult for them to understand the “minutiae and vagueness” (Tipton, Krause 2004) of 
existing regulatory guidelines and the legal consequences of companies’ failure to 
implement correct information controls (Tipton, Krause 2004). Secondly, the difficulty facing 
organisations is that few laws and regulations specify how compliance is to be achieved 
(Sundt 2006). The discretion is then left to organisations themselves in the way they to go 
about achieving compliance. Subsequently, in most cases, the way in which legal and 
regulatory requirements are met depends more on people and procedures than on technical 
controls (Sundt 2006). This implies that there could be misalignment between what 
information security professionals think are the right controls to comply with regulatory 
requirements and what regulatory officials expect. 
To find a solution to the problem of misalignment among the role players in implementing 
and evaluating information security controls, a framework needs to be developed that will 
address the following research questions: 
 How can interpretation problems experienced by the role players relating to the 
implementation and evaluation of information security controls be prevented? 
 What prioritisation challenges are faced by the role players? 
 What can be done to establish a solution/delivery/measurement-oriented approach 
to implement and evaluate information security controls? 
 Are the roles of the three role players clearly defined and understood?  
 
1. How can interpretation problems experienced by the role players relating to the 
implementation and evaluation of information security controls be prevented? 
Often, what auditors discover when conducting their audits is disputed by information 
security professionals (Tipton, Krause 2004). While such information security professionals 
expend their resources trying to provide protection for information assets using various 
controls, ICT security auditors often find these controls to be inadequate. Similarly, this also 
applies to the regulatory authorities. Companies may put in place all the controls they think 
are necessary in order to meet the regulatory requirements only to find that the regulatory 
authorities are not satisfied with these controls (Sundt 2006).  
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Moreover, information security professionals are bombarded with information from 
independent consultants regarding what controls need to be put in place in order to comply 
with various requirements. Sometimes what such consultants recommend may not be in line 
with what the auditors and regulatory officials look for when doing their audits. This lack of 
alignment may be caused by different and inconsistent interpretations of various codes and 
laws by different role players. Such differences may also be attributed to individual 
experience, bias, choice and subjectivity, which then lead to disagreements among the role 
players in terms of what security controls should be put in place, as well as how those 
controls should be implemented (Tipton, Krause 2004).   
2. What prioritisation challenges are faced by the role players? 
Owing to the competition for limited resources, information security professionals find 
themselves having to make difficult decisions with regard to what controls to install first and 
which ones to put in later. This is usually decided through a prioritisation process. However, 
when auditors and regulatory officials assess the controls in the environment they just look 
at what controls have been implemented and which have not. Consequently, they do not 
take into account the fact that some controls may not have been implemented because they 
fall much lower down on the prioritisation list as a result of issues such as budget constraints 
(Business Software Alliance 2003, Courtney 1982)(Business Software Alliance 2003). One of 
the reasons for this is the lack of a framework for setting priorities, assigning tasks, getting 
started and monitoring implementation (Business Software Alliance 2003).  
3. What can be done to establish a solution/delivery/measurement-oriented approach 
to implement and evaluate information security controls? 
The motivation behind implementing information security controls should not be to impress 
ICT security auditors or regulatory officials.  If this is the case, the organisation may resort to 
simply implementing controls for the sake of satisfying the auditors and the regulators, 
without actually extracting or understanding the value provided by those controls – an 
approach that is ineffective and inefficient. Information security controls should be subject 
to appropriate scrutiny using a formal process to articulate and measure the benefits that 
the controls will provide to the business.   
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4. Are the roles of the three role players clearly defined and understood?  
The roles of auditors (especially internal auditors) and certain regulators are sometimes not 
properly articulated. Comsec Ltd, a government agency responsible for information security 
for the state (South Africa) and its agencies, provides consulting (and implementation) 
services, while at the same time performing annual audits to verify that state organs comply 
with Comsec requirements. This approach may create the perception that auditors are not 
independent or objective during the audit process, especially if they conduct an audit on 
what they have implemented in or recommended to an organisation themselves.  
In order to avoid issues related to duplication of efforts, it is critical that the three role 
players work together in implementing and evaluating information security controls. In 
support of this it should be noted that a ‘silo’ approach leads to inefficiencies and a number 
of disadvantages, including putting pressure on resources and a costly “throw-away and 
start again” approach (Pinder 2006). 
1.4 Purpose of the study 
 
The purpose of the study is to develop a framework that can be used by ICT security 
auditors, ICT regulatory officials and information security professionals to implement and 
assess information security controls within organisations in a uniform and consistent 
manner.  
The purpose of the framework is twofold: firstly to ensure that ICT security auditors, 
information security professionals and ICT regulatory authorities understand their respective 
roles and responsibilities with regard to the implementation of security in compliance with 
various requirements. The second purpose of the framework is to help each role player 
understand the work of the other role players. This should, firstly, assist the role players to 
have intelligent dialogue when discussing information security related issues. Secondly, this 
understanding is crucial in reducing or identifying risks that have not been adequately 
addressed (Hermason, Hill & Ivancevich 2000).   
The principle behind the framework is its simplicity and practicality, while at the same time it 
can be adapted to the specific needs of individual organisations. The framework seeks to 
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provide a common language and clear direction and guidance on how information security 
controls should be implemented and evaluated (COSO 2004a). 
1.5 Research objectives 
 
The objectives of the study are to 
 identify areas of mutual understanding among the three role players regarding the 
implementation and evaluation of information security controls. These are areas of 
integration and synchronisation where the role players particularly agree with each 
other. 
 identify the methodologies and tools each role player uses in the implementation 
and/or evaluation of information security controls 
 bridge the gap between the controls that must be implemented by information 
security professionals and what ICT security auditors and regulatory officials look for 
when they evaluate the controls. This will ensure that each role player benefits from 
a better understanding of the terminology, techniques and work approach of the 
other role players. 
 ensure alignment among the role players regarding what must be implemented by 
implementers (information security professionals) vis-à-vis what is evaluated by the 
evaluators (ICT security auditors and regulatory officials). This alignment must be 
established from the very beginning of the information security programme. 
 establish the groundwork of a framework that can be used by the role players to 
implement and evaluate information security controls in South Africa  
1.6 Limitations 
 
This study seeks to establish an information security framework that is applicable to the 
South African environment. To this end, regulations and codes relating to information 
security that are not specifically applicable to the South African environment (e.g. Sarbanes-
Oxley) will not form part of this study.  
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The framework to be developed will focus primarily on large enterprises. Typically, these are 
organisations that have 250 or more employees (Oldsman, Hallberg 2006). Small enterprises 
will not be explicitly covered because, it may be argued, they rarely establish a dedicated 
information security group/department owing to factors such as budget constraints and 
shortage of expertise (Eloff, Eloff 2005). 
The study will be biased towards the financial and telecommunications industries. These are 
industries that are greatly affected by many stringent regulations (ISACA 2008a). 
The three role players forming part of this study are not the only important role players in 
information security. There are many other important ones, including the board of directors, 
the executive management, senior and middle managers, and all other employees of the 
organisation (Von Solms, Von Solms 2006b). However, this study is limited to looking at 
information security professionals, ICT security auditors and regulatory officials, and thus the 
final framework to be derived will only be applicable to these three role players.  
1.7 Significance of the study 
 
The framework that will be the outcome of this research study is intended for use by the role 
players in the implementation and assessment of information security controls in South 
African organisations. It will help the role players understand what exactly is expected of 
them. Moreover, it will assist each role player in understanding what is expected of the 
other role players, which will help to minimise instances of ambiguities and issues around 
semantics.  
The framework will play a crucial role in bringing about much-needed alignment among the 
three role players. This alignment will ensure that information security professionals do not 
view ICT auditors and regulatory officials as enemies who are looking to find something 
negative in their work. Instead, they should view them as partners in helping them to fulfil 
their main goal: ensuring effective information security in the organisation (Wright 2008). 
Similarly, this framework will assist in ensuring that the ICT auditors and regulatory officials 
do not approach the auditees with a view to finding only the negative aspects of their work; 
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they approach their work with the intention of helping auditees improve their controls to 
acceptable levels. 
The alignment to be brought about by the framework seeks to minimise unnecessary 
debates among the role players. Instead, it will assist in ensuring that the role players 
understand each other’s work. This will help to guarantee that the role players are able to 
reach conclusions or agreements quicker and will save the organisation resources (time and 
money) by having the role players spend more time implementing and assessing controls 
than on debates (finger-pointing) about the differences regarding the controls.   
1.8 Methodology 
 
The research methodology employed in this study is primarily of a phenomenological nature. 
This is also known as interpretivist research –the researcher gathers information and filters 
it, while involving him/herself in the study (Maphakela 2008). In this kind of research, 
subjectivity plays a role, with the researcher having to argue his/her interpretation of the 
research area and the proposed solution (Maphakela 2008).  
The literature study will cover the following areas: 
 The status of information security in South Africa. This includes the initiatives taking 
place in South Africa as well as the regulatory regime. 
 Three key role players in the implementation of information security. The intention 
here is to also look at the methodologies, techniques and tools they use to execute 
their duties. 
 Key challenges in the implementation and evaluation of information security 
controls. 
 An overview of key current information security and related frameworks. 
The data to be used in the literature study will be collected mainly from journal articles, 
conference papers, books, previous dissertations/theses and the web (internet) in general.  
On conclusion of the literature study, a logical argumentation will be established which will 
lead to the creation of the SAISA framework. 
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1.9 Definitions of key terms 
 
An ICT security auditor is an independent person within or outside the organisation who 
checks the status of information security (Wright 2008). ICT security auditing responsibilities 
involve providing independent evaluations of an organisation’s policies, procedures, 
standards, measures and practices for safeguarding electronic information from loss, 
damage, unintended disclosure, or denial of availability (EDP Audit Committee 1995). 
The regulatory officials’ role is to ensure that the laws and other regulatory requirements 
are complied with. These officials can impose penalties and sanctions on the offending party 
in the event of a deviation from the regulatory requirements. One example of such a 
regulator is COMSEC Ltd, which is mandated to ensure that state organs comply with the 
COMSEC Act (Comsec 2009). In this study, however, the term regulatory official does not just 
refer to the external regulators; it also includes professionals such as legal counsels and ICT 
lawyers who have the legal expertise to interrogate information security controls in relation 
to the legal requirements. Compliance officers also fall into this category, as they have a 
responsibility to provide the organisation with guidance on legal, regulatory and contractual 
compliance (ISACA 2011a). 
Information security professionals, also known as security practitioners or information 
security officers, are the individuals who develop and implement information security 
policies and standards within the organisation. The policies they develop must be in line with 
the regulatory requirements, while at the same time help organisations to meet their goals 
(ISO/IEC 27002 2007). Information security is the protection of information from a wide 
range of threats in order to ensure business continuity, minimise business risk, and maximise 
return on investment and business opportunities (ISO/IEC 27002 2007). 
A framework is a broad overview, outline, or skeleton of interlinked items which supports a 
particular approach to a specific objective, and serves as a guide that can be modified as 
required by adding or deleting items (Business Dictionary 2009). 
Role players in this study are regulatory officials, information security professionals and ICT 
security auditors. 
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1.10 Dissertation Layout 
 
The layout of this dissertation is depicted on figure 1.1 below: 
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Chapter 1 (Introduction): This chapter provides an outline of this research study. It 
introduces the study and the motivation behind it. It further defines the problem statement 
as well as the research questions underpinning the study. The key terms used in this study 
are defined in this chapter. It concludes with an overview of the remaining chapters.  
Chapter 2 (Status of information security in South Africa): This chapter seeks to establish 
initiatives taken in South Africa (SA) with regard to information security. Areas to be covered 
in this chapter include activities initiated by the government and the private sector, as well 
as through public–private partnerships. Another area of interest will be the regulatory 
environment and this will include legislation passed by the South African government and 
the generic codes and standards affecting information security in South Africa. Focus will 
also fall on any other South African organisations that have come up with initiatives that 
have advanced the interests of the information security community. Establishing this status 
will be crucial in understanding the parameters within which the role players operate in 
terms of the implementation and evaluation of information security controls. 
Chapter 3 (Role players in the implementation of information security): In this chapter the 
roles and responsibilities of each of the three role players (ICT security auditors, information 
security professionals and regulatory officials) are discussed in detail. The chapter dwells on 
the various approaches and methodologies employed by each role player as they go about 
implementing or assessing information security controls in organisations. Understanding the 
roles and responsibilities is critical in establishing the common areas and the areas of 
difference among these key role players regarding the implementation and evaluation of 
information security controls. Establishing this understanding is an important step towards 
the formulation of the new framework. 
Chapter 4 (Challenges in implementation and evaluation of information security 
requirements): The primary purpose of this chapter is to look at the challenges specific to 
each role player as they implement or assess information security controls in an 
organisation. These challenges may emanate from the role player’s profession itself or as a 
result of frustrations caused by other circumstances. The challenges presented by 
misalignments among the role players in the implementation and evaluation of information 
security controls will be studied in this chapter. Understanding these challenges will help 
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craft a framework that addresses these challenges with a view to creating a solution to 
them.  
Chapter 5 (Current information security frameworks): This chapter takes the reader 
through a number of existing frameworks and standards that have an impact on information 
security. Each framework being studied is evaluated by highlighting the strengths and 
weaknesses of the framework.  
Chapter 6 (What makes a good framework?): This chapter focuses on the elements and 
attributes found in various frameworks. It also seeks to determine the common attributes 
among them so that what makes a good framework can be established. This information will 
inform the design and structure of the new framework.  
Chapter 7 (The SAISA framework): The crux of this research study is presented in this 
chapter. Based on the research, a framework for implementing and evaluating information 
security controls is formulated for the role players. The framework is the actual deliverable 
that can then be applied in a real-world situation.  
Chapter 9 (Conclusion): This chapter summarises the outcome of this research study. The 
reader is reminded of the initial objectives and then the outcome of the study is compared 
with those objectives to ascertain whether they have all been met. This chapter also 
proposes future work to be undertaken on the basis of this study.
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Every organisation (private or public) relies on its information assets in order to prosper and 
survive (Mears, Von Solms 2004). This information is either in a transmitted mode or stored 
mode (Pfleeger, Pfleeger 2002). Subsequently, organisations are today conducting business 
in an interconnected and information-rich environment (Eloff, Eloff 2005). While the 
technologies and other media used to transmit and store information are useful in supplying 
business solutions, they also bring with them complex vulnerabilities (Eloff, Eloff 2005). 
Means of transmission vary from traditional methods such as post, courier, telephone, fax 
and video conferencing to modern methods such as email and the internet.  
While information in the possession of the organisation can be used legitimately, it can also 
be used in ways that have the potential to harm the organisation in one way or another. The 
legitimate use of information assists organisations in sustaining and enhancing their business 
operations. This also involves the sharing of information with other stakeholders such as 
customers, shareholders, auditors and regulatory officials. Such sharing of information 
promotes transparency, which is a necessity for the organisation’s corporate governance 
(King 2009). On the other hand, information can be used by unauthorised users who have 
ulterior motives for inflicting damage on the organisation. Unauthorised activities include 
hacking, information theft and denial of service attacks (Peltier, Peltier & Blackley 2005). 
For information to be useful and reliable, it must be kept secure. Reliable information assists 
organisations to plan properly, use resources optimally and make other strategic decisions. 
Organisations must take measures to ensure that their information is protected and is 
reliable. If information is compromised it can have catastrophic results for organisations, for 
example corporate embarrassment, regulatory failure and/or financial loss (Williams 2007). 
Consequently, investment in the protection of information is not an option but a necessity.  
National strategic institutions that rely on the accuracy and reliability of information, such as 
hospitals, airports, banks, water and electricity companies, could all be the target of attacks. 
If such institutions were to be victims of attacks, the country could be crippled. Owing to 
their strategic nature, such institutions could also be targets for terrorists who may want to 
destabilise the country and the economy. In response to 21st century pressures (e.g. 
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increased regulation, greater consumer choice, enhanced globalisation and terrorism), a 
holistic approach capable of recognising, preventing and reacting to threats to information 
assets is required (Williams 2007). 
To ensure that a holistic approach to protecting the organisation’s information assets and 
the national critical infrastructure is employed, public and private sector partnerships are 
very important in combating information security threats. South Africa has recognised this 
and has responded by embarking on initiatives to create and maintain public–private 
partnerships. These public–private partnerships have seen the creation of forums for 
knowledge sharing and collaboration. These include the Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research, Business Against Crime South Africa, the South African Fraud Prevention Service 
and the South African Banking Risk Information Centre (FIC 2004). Public–
private/partnerships have the potential to yield better results because such partnerships 
have led to great successes in preventing and combating threats such as cyber fraud (FIC 
2004). 
This chapter will cover the various information security threats facing the organisations in a 
South African environment. It looks at issues such as technological advancements, motives 
for attacks and economic effects of information security attacks. It discusses the various 
initiatives that have taken place in South Africa in response to the information security 
requirements. 
2.2 Information security threats 
 
Organisations use systems to create, store and transmit their information (Posthumus, Von 
Solms 2004). In order to preserve the security of information, certain attributes must be 
preserved during the life-cycle of information. These are the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information (ISO/IEC 27002 2007). Information can also have other properties 
such as authenticity, accountability, non-repudiation and reliability (ISO/IEC 27002 2007). 
Since the majority of information is created, stored and transmitted through systems such as 
computers and networks, it is vital that they (systems) are properly configured to ensure 
that information passing through them meets the requirements of information security. 
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Information security threats are influenced by many factors. The scope of this study will not 
cover all the threats to information security, but will highlight the most common ones. 
Today, organisations are becoming increasingly dependent on technology. Technology has 
already become widely integrated into most organisations and can, therefore, be said to 
form the cornerstone of all information processing, storage and transmission (Posthumus, 
Von Solms 2004). Moreover, the proliferation of mobile devices in the modern organisation 
is staggering. With so many mobile devices in the enterprise, defending corporate data from 
leaks, either intentionally or via loss or theft of a device, is challenging. A 2011 report by 
Frost and Sullivan identified mobile devices as the second highest security concern for 
modern organisations (Ayoub 2011). 
Information security threats are also influenced by the motives of those initiating attacks. 
Some of the motives are less serious (e.g. fun and games, thrills and bragging rights), while 
others are very serious (e.g. intelligence and financial gain) (Sagar 2005). Information 
security attacks can have serious economic effects (Symantec 2011), as nations and 
organisations use huge resources in combating information security threats and attacks.  
In the 2011 report by Frost and Sullivan (Ayoub 2011), application vulnerabilities were 
identified as the top security threat concern. These vulnerabilities may be caused by various 
factors including the poor design of the system.  
Critical infrastructure around the world has for some time been the target of cyber-related 
attacks for criminals, for political or other reasons. Hackers have access to a growing range 
of tools and techniques that could be used to engage in malicious activity directed against 
the computer-related components of critical infrastructure (Gordon 2003). Critical 
infrastructure consists of physical and information technology facilities, networks and assets 
(e.g. energy distribution networks, health services, essential utilities, transportation) which, 
if disrupted or destroyed, could seriously affect the health, safety, security and economic 
wellbeing of the country’s residents. In addition, the effective functioning of industry and of 
government would be significantly affected. 
The above-mentioned factors will now be examined in more detail. 
Status of Information Security in South Africa 
Chapter 2   31  
 
2.2.1 Technology advancements 
 
The advent of new technologies in the 21st century has brought about new risks owing to 
their ease of accessibility and their powerful nature. These technologies could be used in 
ways that seek to harm the targeted organisations/institutions and to destabilise them. 
Nowadays it is easy for anyone to go to the internet and find a hacking tool which can be 
used to cause damage to the target computer or the network. This kind of threat is usually 
referred to as ‘script kiddie’ owing to the low levels of programming, technical skills or 
knowledge required to conduct sophisticated attacks (Tipton, Krause 2004). Today, the 
problem has been exacerbated by the increasing usage of social media networks. For 
example, a tool was discovered that allows script kiddie to build botnets via Twitter (Jacoby 
2010). 
The advancement of technology continues to outpace the policy for law enforcement. 
Information security defence is still an immature field and the skills required to provide such 
defences are scarce and inadequate (Idefense 2008). There are also challenges of 
coordination among the agencies of different countries, which is further complicated by 
cases where there are conflicting national policies (e.g. on cyber crime), which are an 
advantage to cyber criminals who can choose to operate from geographic locations where 
penalties for some forms of cybercrime may not yet exist (Cashell et al. 2004).  
The nature and sophistication of attacks are changing too. Far fewer attacks take down an 
organisation’s entire IT system; instead, attacks now penetrate IT systems without impairing 
them, with their specific goal being to siphon off sensitive information over time without 
detection (Warner, Harris 2010). This means that if security professionals are expecting 
systems disruption as a sign that there is an attack underway, then they are likely to miss 
serious attacks which seek to steal information without causing visible disruptions.  
2.2.2 Motives for attacks 
 
The motive behind attacks has become more serious and such attacks are systematically 
planned to cause maximum damage to the victims. Such motives include the following (Brag 
2003): 
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 Military and intelligence. These are attacks in which spies try to learn government 
secrets or disrupt government operations.  
 Business. Attacks between competitors trying to hijack trade secrets. 
 Financial gain. Attacks in which criminals try to trick banks or other financial 
institutions into sending them money or allocating them credit in an account against 
which they can make payments. 
 Terrorists. Attacks in which politically motivated agents attempt to scare or harm the 
public by corrupting the computers of government, utilities or corporations. 
 Grudge. Attacks in which disgruntled employees seek revenge on employers by 
wrecking their information systems. 
 Consumer fraud (identity theft). Attacks in which con artists steal personally 
identifiable information about consumers (such as ID numbers or credit card 
numbers) so they can impersonate those consumers when purchasing goods or 
applying for credit or in which the con artists sell consumers bogus goods or services. 
From these it is clear that information security threats affect every sphere of the economy, 
including both public and private industries, and their consequences are far reaching. 
2.2.3 Economic effects of information security attacks 
 
Information security attacks have negative effects on the organisation’s financial position in 
one way or the other. Some attacks can have small effects on the organisation’s business 
operations while others may have huge effects that may threaten its functioning and the 
survival. In addition, information security attacks have direct and indirect implications for 
the organisation’s financial position and these include costs associated with putting 
preventative measures in place, the costs of remediation, the costs of bandwidth and 
equipment and the opportunity costs of congestion (Anderson, Choobineh 2008, 
International Telecommunication Union 2008). 
While information security risks and threats are usually viewed in a negative light, it is 
important to note that the same threats also open up opportunities for other legal and 
legitimate businesses to thrive. Such businesses include anti-virus/anti-spam companies, 
security consultancy companies and network protection companies (firewalls and intrusion 
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detection vendors). Owing to the broad range of financial implications identified above, 
information security related issues, such as spam and malware, create mixed and sometimes 
conflicting incentives for stakeholders. Consequently, coherent responses to the problem 
are complicated (International Telecommunication Union 2008). 
Studies have been undertaken to measure information security related attacks in monetary 
terms and the reports produced indicate the huge economic effects. For instance, a recent 
study by Norton in 2011 revealed the cost of cybercrime as US $114 billion annually 
(Symantec 2011). Malware incidents have also been cited as contributing to the increased 
costs of IT (Ponemon Institute 2010). This goes to show how serious the economic effects 
resulting from information security related incidents are (Cashell et al. 2004).  
South Africa faces two major information security related crimes that have crippling 
economic effects. These are identity theft and phishing. There have been cases where users 
have been tricked into divulging their login information used to access their bank accounts. 
The financial institutions are, however, providing extra layers of security which include the 
use of security controls such as one time passwords (OTP) or random verification numbers 
(RVN) sent through cell phones and/or email in order to provide more security on certain 
transactions. While such measures provide an added layer of protection, it should be noted 
that this form of security has been compromised by syndicates that work with employees of 
mobile network operators to divert the OTPs or RVNs of the compromised bank accounts. A 
case in point is a R7 million scam that was allegedly perpetrated by a Vodacom employee. It 
is suspected that the Vodacom employee, working together with a syndicate, intercepted 
security SMSs (carrying OTPs and RVNs) issued to banking clients. Syndicate members would 
receive the messages and use them to conduct fraudulent online banking transactions 
(Dingle 2009).  
The public sector has also not been spared information security related attacks. In recent 
years, South African government departments have become the victims of cybercrime which 
has cost the departments huge sums of money. Most of these crimes occur in the form of 
identity theft, phishing and the use of other hacking technologies such as spyware and 
keyloggers (Emigh 2005). For example, in June 2008, the KwaZulu-Natal government 
announced that cybercrime using sypware was committed in its departments of transport, 
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education, health, housing and agriculture. The value of the money swindled as a result of 
these crimes was more than R199 million (SAPA 2009). In another example, the Mpumalanga 
government lost a total of R5.5 million, which was stolen from its department of education 
Nedbank account after unauthorised access was gained to its basic management system 
(Mahlong 2009). 
The occurrence of the information security attacks indicates that without proper controls 
the public and private sectors will continue losing money as a result of such attacks. The 
reported cases are in all likelihood the tip of the iceberg, as some companies are reluctant to 
report information security breaches owing to the reputational risks caused by bad publicity 
(Cashell et al. 2004). Despite this, some companies have adopted a transparent approach, 
for example, Zurich, an insurance company, issued a press statement after the organisation 
had lost one of its backup tapes containing client information (Renton 2009). Furthermore, 
criminals are being tried in South Africa’s courts for crimes related to cybercrime although 
the rate of successful convictions is not clear at this stage. 
2.2.4 Proliferation of portable devices  
 
Owing to their perceived ease of use and the associated improved productivity, 
organisations have seen a proliferation of mobile devices in their environments. Mobile 
devices include laptops, tablets, cell phones and memory sticks. This has resulted in huge 
amounts of information, including emails, confidential documents and contact information, 
being commonly stored on these devices by employees. Confidential documents may 
contain information such as trade secrets, strategies and plans which are critical to the 
organisation’s sustainability and survival. Moreover, disclosure of these documents to 
unauthorised users could leave an organisation facing many problems including lawsuits and 
loss of business and competitive advantage. 
As a result of their mobile nature and small size, mobile devices can be easily misplaced or 
stolen. For example, in August 2008 a story broke about how the laptop belonging to the 
then Deputy Minister of Home Affairs (Malusi Gigaba) had landed up in a shop. Someone 
had dropped it there for recharging (Daily News Reporter 2008). The laptop had previously 
been reported lost. Fortunately for the deputy minister and the department, the shop’s 
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owner became suspicious after receiving the laptop and was able to report it to the relevant 
officials. Based on this, some critical questions may be asked: What if the laptop had fallen 
on the wrong hands? What if the laptop had contained sensitive information about the 
country? Such questions indicate that, without sufficiently applied security controls, mobile 
devices pose serious risks.  
Adding to the problem of the risks associated with mobile devices is the issue of mobile 
networking sites. Social networking sites have become very popular avenues for people to 
communicate with family, friends and colleagues from around the corner or across the 
globe. While there can be benefits from the collaborative, distributed approaches promoted 
by the responsible use of social networking sites, there are information security and privacy 
concerns associated with such sites (MS-ISAC 2010). Subsequently, the data suggest that an 
increasing volume of cybercrime is being directed at internet users on social networking sites 
(Reitlerlaw 2010). 
With so many laws and regulations pertaining to the protection of information and privacy 
requirements, it is becoming increasingly necessary to enforce information security controls 
on mobile devices. Accordingly, all mobile devices now need to be considered enterprise 
mobile workstations (Hoffman 2007). As such, they need to be treated as if they are 
‘mobile’ workstations and must contain the very same protections (and more) that are 
afforded to LAN-based desktop workstations. Mobile devices are on the front line and they 
require in-depth protection— not providing it may have fatal consequences (Hoffman 2007). 
2.2.5 Vulnerabilities of physical controls for information 
 
The mistake that is usually made by information security professionals is to focus on 
information stored only on information systems and to pay less attention to information 
stored in other mediums. The most often neglected form of information is the one in 
physical format. Most critical infrastructure systems (although of a physical nature) rely 
heavily on information and process control systems for management and for functioning 
properly. 
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Information and process control systems play a crucial role in ensuring the stability of critical 
infrastructure. For example, the oil and gas industries use them to control flow in pipelines 
and refinery production; the electric power industry uses them to optimise power 
generation capacity and delivery; chemical plants depend on them for managing 
formulations and ensuring efficient production; water treatment systems rely on them for 
purification and delivery (Wybourne, Austin & Palmer 2009). There is a great deal of other 
infrastructure that could be added to this list, including air traffic control, transportation 
systems, nuclear power, as well as healthcare-related technologies such as embedded 
medical devices. 
Critical information and process control systems consist of computers and the networks that 
interconnect them, as well as the sensors and actuators that physically monitor and control 
the processes. When first introduced in the late 1960s, process control systems were a 
collection of special-purpose computers and sensors on closed, often proprietary, local 
networks (Wybourne, Austin & Palmer 2009). As such, these early systems were relatively 
easy to protect from electronic intrusion and sabotage. However, as technology has evolved 
and process control systems have been developed to achieve better control, operational 
efficiency and audit capabilities, the security situation has changed. The internet, a cost-
effective and easily available means to connect systems, has been a significant contributing 
factor in this change (Wybourne, Austin & Palmer 2009). 
The security challenges associated with process control systems must be met within the 
framework of two key attributes: first, the systems must operate in real time, which limits 
any latent time available for security-related processing; secondly, the systems ideally 
should be uninterruptible but at least be able to recover rapidly and safely after an 
information security related disruption (Wybourne, Austin & Palmer 2009). An additional 
challenge is that process control systems often incorporate legacy components that have 
little built-in security. 
Besides the fact that the physical critical infrastructure depend on information systems, 
there are other physical mediums that keep information. These include information on 
physical documents (e.g. books, meeting minutes and strategy documents) and some 
written on boards (discussion boards – someone may peep through the window and see 
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what is written on the board, which could be of a confidential nature) (ISO/IEC 27002 2007). 
The other information medium, which is rather difficult to protect, is the one in oral form 
and kept in people’s memories. Once people have been exposed to sensitive information, it 
could take just one conversation with a colleague to reveal privileged information. Some 
companies and institutions rely on having their employees sign non-disclosure or 
confidentiality agreements, which act as one preventative measure, but such practices do 
not fully eliminate the risk.   
2.2.6 Poorly designed systems 
 
Poorly designed systems pose a great threat to the overall functioning of the final system. As 
has been noted above, most of the critical infrastructure systems are dependent on 
information and control process systems. If such systems were to be successfully attacked 
the country could find itself at a standstill. Systems that do not incorporate security from the 
design and implementation stages are more prone to successful attacks. Furthermore, the 
implications of such attacks are far wider than the system that is successfully attacked. 
There are two ways of ensuring that security is not neglected during the design and 
implementation of the system: firstly, security should be made a consideration throughout 
the software development lifecycle and, secondly, it is important that the users and 
developers of those computer systems have security built into their understanding and use 
of the systems. People trained to understand the importance of security are far more likely 
to follow security guidelines and to strive to improve and streamline them (Wybourne, 
Austin & Palmer 2009).  
This section has indicated how complex and challenging the area of information security has 
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2.3 Initiatives affecting information security in South 
Africa 
 
South Africa has realised the importance of information security. This realisation has 
resulted in different initiatives being undertaken to address information security needs. 
There are many initiatives undertaken within the country to this effect, not all of which can 
be discussed as part of this study. The focus in this study is on the initiatives affecting the 
financial and the telecommunications environment (towards which this study is inclined). 
The initiatives include the passing of the legislation and drafting of Bills such as the 
following:  
 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act of 2002 
 Regulation of Interception of Communication and Provision of Communication-
related Act of 2002 
 Protection of Personal Information Bill 
 The Promotion of Access to Information Act of 2000 
 Financial Intelligence Centre Act of 2001  
 Electronic Communications Security (Pty) Ltd Act of 2002 
 
The initiatives undertaken have also included public–private partnerships as well as those 
spear headed by private organisations. These initiatives, attractive to information security 
professionals and ICT security auditors, have contributed positively in addressing 
information security threats and risks in South Africa. Many of these initiatives have impact 
on financial and telecommunications industries. The following initiatives have been 
identified as playing a key role with regard to information security in South Africa:  
 
 The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) 
 Business Against Crime South Africa (BAC) 
 The South African Fraud Prevention Service (SAFPS) 
 South African Banking Risk Information Centre (SABRIC) 
 Information Security Group of Africa (ISG Africa) 
 ISACA South Africa Chapter 
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 Information Security For South Africa (ISSA) 
 Annual ITWeb Security Summit 
 Auditing Firms 
 
The above mentioned initiatives, Acts, Bills and public–private collaborations all have 
implications for information security in one way or another. These will be briefly discussed 
below. 
2.3.1 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act (ECT Act), 
2002 
 
The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act (ECT Act) became law in 2002, 
addressing a number of issues related to electronic communications. The issues pertaining 
to information security that this Act specifically addresses include legal certainty, security, 
protection of individuals and illegal activities and enforcement (Michalson, Hughes 2005). As 
such, the Act recognises the importance of information security and offers protection to 
consumers particularly with regard to the release of their personal information. 
2.3.2 Regulation of Interception of Communication Act, 2002 
 
The purpose of the Regulation of Interception of Communication Act (RICA) is to allow 
enforcement agencies to intercept communication to investigate or directly prevent serious 
crime (De Wet 2003). This is critical because, with the technological advancement that is 
currently taking place, such technologies are sometimes used to commit crimes (especially 
against the communication infrastructure). This Act affects institutions such as internet 
service providers (ISPs) and telecommunications operators because they should be able to 
provide interception services when required by law enforcement agencies.   
In drafting RICA, considerable care was taken to ensure that the two competing rights – 
privacy and security – are properly balanced and not infringed unreasonably. This is because 
once there is a system in place that enables the monitoring and interception of 
communication the temptation for abuse begins (De Wet 2003).  
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2.3.3 Protection of Personal Information Bill 
 
The purpose of this Bill is to ensure the protection and release of personal information. 
Under this Act all businesses are required to provide legal protection for a person, employee 
or client when their personal information is collected, stored or used by another party 
(Deloitte 2011). 
The Bill seeks to protect the public from the involuntary release of personal information. In 
other words, the use of personal information, which has been provided voluntarily, by an 
individual for any other purpose than that for which it was originally provided, without the 
individual’s consent, would be illegal and would be an offence under the Act (Deloitte 2011).   
2.3.4 The Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA) 
 
The Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA) gives every person in South Africa the 
right of access to information held by the state and other persons and institutions. This 
means anyone can request access to information held by public bodies, as well as a natural 
or juristic person (SAHRC 2009). 
This Act contains penal provisions for the intentional and fraudulent concealment or 
falsification of records and provides that a person acting in such a manner is guilty of an 
offence and liable for a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years (Internet 
Service Providers’ Association 2007). This therefore means that if the information security 
procedures in an institution are not sound, such that the integrity and availability of its 
information is compromised, the affected institution could be liable for a fine or 
imprisonment under this Act. 
2.3.5 Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 2001 (FICA) 
 
The Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA) was established to combat money-laundering 
activities and the financing of terrorist and related activities and to impose certain duties on 
institutions and other persons who might be used for money-laundering purposes and the 
financing of terrorist and related activities (FIC 2004). This Act mainly affects financial 
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institutions such as banks and insurance companies. However, it also affects estate agencies 
which can be used for money-laundering purposes.  
2.3.6 Electronic Communications Security (Pty) Ltd Act, 2002 
 
The purpose of the Electronic Communications Security (Pty) Ltd (COMSEC) Act was the 
establishment of COMSEC (Pty) Ltd as an institutional authority to, among other things, 
identify and protect critical infrastructure; and to protect and secure critical electronic 
communications of the organs of state against unauthorised access in the form of technical, 
electronic or any other related threats (Padayachie 2008). 
The company, in concurrence with the National Intelligence Agency, provides verification 
services for the electronic communications security systems, products and services used by 
the state (Comsec 2009).  
2.3.7  King III 
 
While the previous King report, King ll, indirectly addressed some information security 
needs, the latest report (King III) looks specifically at IT security (“information security”) as 
one of the critical areas a company’s board of directors must pay attention to as part of IT 
governance. The report recommends that the board must consider the importance of and 
need for IT security because, among other things, IT security contributes to enabling the 
business strategy, sustaining normal operations and meeting compliance requirements (King 
2009).  
2.3.8 Minimum Information Security Standards (MISS) 
 
The Minimum Information Security Standards (MISS) document was approved by the South 
African Cabinet as a national information security document in December 1996 (McKinley 
2003). The MISS is a comprehensive security document dealing with various aspects of 
information security including applications, documents, communication and physical 
security measures. 
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2.3.9 The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research  
 
The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) is embarking on a project that will 
focus on helping the country to put strategies in place to counter any information warfare 
that may be conducted against it (Africa 2009). This research was triggered by a spate of 
cyber attacks that were directed at Estonian websites over a period of three weeks (Africa 
2009). It is expected that this research project will be especially valuable to the South African 
Defence Force (SANDF), as its findings will improve the Defence Force’s capabilities to 
protect the country against threats such as cyber attacks.  
2.3.10 Business Against Crime South Africa (BAC) 
 
Business Against Crime South Africa (BAC), a non-governmental organisation, was formed in 
order to combat crime using public–private partnerships (Stavrou 2002). BAC focuses 
substantially on commercial crime involving the use of IT systems. BAC provides support in 
combating these crimes through the provision of specialised training for detectives and court 
investigators. 
2.3.11 The South African Fraud Prevention Service (SAFPS) 
 
The South African Fraud Prevention Service (SAFPS) was formed in 2000 and started its 
operations in July 2001. The role of the SAFPS is to assist in the fight against impersonation 
and identity theft (SAFPS 2009). Its primary objective is to provide fraud prevention data-
sharing services across all sectors of South African businesses. According to the SAFPS, their 
service has contributed to South Africa’s economy and business through the prevention of 
more than R3 billion in attempted fraud (SAFPS 2009). Such efforts are clearly yielding 
positive results in combating e-crime.  
2.3.12 South African Banking Risk Information Centre (SABRIC) 
 
South African Banking Risk Information Centre (SABRIC) was created by The Banking 
Association of South Africa to provide intelligence support to banks against crime including 
e-crime. Its key stakeholders are the South African banks. SABRIC works on one key business 
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principle: detect, prevent and reduce organised crime in the banking industry through 
effective public–private partnerships (SABRIC 2009). 
2.3.13 Information Security Group of Africa (ISG Africa) 
 
Information Security Group of Africa (ISG Africa) is a non-profit organisation formed in 2005. 
It was created in response to the increase of IT security compromises and cyber crime in 
South Africa and the rest of the African continent (ISG-AFRICA 2012). Its major activities are 
to raise executive awareness and assist organisations with the broad range of information 
risks facing the African continent (ISG-AFRICA 2012). 
ISG Africa consists of security professionals from corporate, government and IT. It provides 
the mechanism for regular exchange of information security knowledge (ISG-AFRICA 2012). 
It facilitates networking within the community whilst raising awareness of vulnerabilities and 
global threats in the African context. The Group has played a pivotal role in raising the 
profile of information security in South Africa and Africa (ISG-AFRICA 2012). 
2.3.14 ISACA South Africa Chapter 
 
The ISACA South Africa Chapter’s mission is to promote the assurance, security and 
governance of information systems (IS) in South Africa (ISACA-SA 2012). 
The chapter's main objectives are (ISACA-SA 2012):  
 To promote the education of, and help expand the knowledge and skills of its 
members in the interrelated fields of auditing, quality assurance, security, IS audit 
and control, and IT governance. 
 To encourage an open exchange of IS audit and control, quality assurance, and 
security techniques, approaches, and problem solving by its members. 
 To promote adequate communication to keep members abreast of current events in 
IS audit and control, quality assurance, and security fields that can be of benefit to 
them and their employers. 
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 To communicate to management, auditors, universities, and to IS professionals the 
importance of establishing controls necessary to ensure the effective organization 
and utilisation of IT resources. 
 To promote the Association's professional certifications. 
2.3.15 Information Security For South Africa (ISSA) 
 
Information Security for South Africa (ISSA) is the annual conference for the information 
security community established in 2001. Since 2010, ISSA is co-sponsored by the IEEE 
Systems, Man and Cybernetics Society (SMCS) Chapter (a chapter of the IEEE South Africa 
Section) (ISSA 2012). The annual ISSA conference continues to be recognised as a platform 
for professionals from industry as well as researchers to share their knowledge, experience 
and research results in the field of information security on a South African, but also on an 
international level (ISSA 2012). 
2.3.16 Annual ITWeb Security Summit 
 
The annual security summit, hosted by ITWeb, is the meeting place for IT and information 
security professionals, industry experts, analysts and solutions providers (ITWeb 2012). It is 
targeted to personnel operating within information security industry. 
2.3.17 Auditing Firms 
 
The auditing firms such as PWC, Delloite, KPMG, SizweNtsalubaGobodo and Ernest & Young 
also have a particular focus in information security in a form of auditing and consulting in 
South Africa. They play a key role by advising their clients on matters concerning information 
security. 
2.4 Conclusion  
 
South African organisations, like their international counterparts, are facing various 
information security related risks as a result of their high dependency on their information 
assets and the systems that process them. Information security threats emanate from 
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various sources, such as cyber terrorism, phishing, hacking, denial of service attacks and 
identity thefts. Consequently, if no proper controls are put in place to address information 
security risks, the organisations could pay the price. To address this, South Africa has 
embarked on various initiatives that have seen the creation of legislation and codes such as 
King III. These have been complemented by the establishment of public–private partnerships 
that go a long way in combating information security related risks.  
Information security controls are broadly divided into two categories. These are technical 
controls (e.g. firewalls, antivirus) and non-technical controls (e.g. policies, user awareness). 
The controls that are implemented are based on the internal requirements (e.g. business 
strategy) and the external requirements (e.g. industry codes and regulatory codes). To 
implement and evaluate the information security controls requires the skills and the 
involvement of key role players. The next chapter will discuss the key role players in the 
implementation and evaluation of information security controls.  
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Information security is one of the corporate governance requirements that must be 
implemented and maintained during the normal course of business operations. The reasons 
behind this include regulatory and legal requirements, the maintenance of a competitive 
edge for the business and the sustaining of the business operations (Hermason, Hill & 
Ivancevich 2000). This requires that information security to be made part of the internal 
controls that govern the processes, operations and transactions that constitute the life of 
the organisation (Manjak 2006). 
As indicated in chapter 1, the implementation and evaluation of information security 
controls requires the maintenance of proper checks and balances in line with corporate 
governance principles. To this end, three role players were identified as being important in 
the implementation and evaluation of information security controls. These are information 
security professionals, ICT security auditors and regulatory officials. Each role player has a 
crucial role to play in ensuring that the proper checks and balances are maintained.  
While information security professionals are mandated with implementing information 
security controls, their work must be checked and verified by ICT security auditors and 
regulatory officials.  
The rest of the chapter will focus on the three role players with regard to the 
implementation and evaluation of information security. It will focus on each role player by 
looking at issues such as the nature of their role, their challenges, their industry standards 
and the various approaches they use to execute their responsibilities.   
3.2 Information security professionals 
 
For information security professionals to execute their duties successfully, they need to work 
with different levels of authority within an organisation. These levels range from board, 
executive management to user levels (Kritzinger, Smith 2008). Furthermore, information 
security professionals must communicate and work with other internal and external 
stakeholders such as the auditors and regulatory officials. It is, therefore, a necessity that 
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information security professionals possess the communication skills that enable them to 
communicate with users at different levels of an organisation, as well as external 
stakeholders (Tipton, Krause 2004). 
In addition, it is critical for information security professionals to understand that there are 
three dimensions in the implementation of information security controls. The first dimension 
pertains to technical issues (e.g. encryption and firewalls) while the second pertains to non-
technical issues also called administrative controls (e.g. security policies and legal aspects) 
(Kritzinger, Smith 2008). The third dimension is the physical dimension (e.g. biometric and 
access cards) (Cunningham et al. 2005, Pfleeger, Pfleeger 2002).  
In order to implement the activities associated with security controls, information security 
officers can apply various methods and methodologies. However, before the methodologies 
for implementing security can be applied, a security plan needs to be put in place. This plan 
must be drawn up on the basis of the outcome of a risk analysis exercise (Von Solms, Von 
Solms 2004). This approach ensures that the prioritisation of the security controls being put 
in place is in accordance with both the risks and the threats facing the organisation. 
3.2.1 Role of information security professionals 
 
Information security professionals are tasked with protecting the organisation’s information 
assets, while ensuring that the controls put in place are in line with the organisation’s 
strategic goals. The role of information security professionals is steadily changing: they are 
now responsible for the security of many facets of an organisation, including regulatory 
compliance, legal compliance, data security and access control (Ayoub 2011). Accordingly, 
information security professionals must find a balance between implementing the right 
controls in the organisation’s environment while positively contributing to the organisation’s 
goals. If poorly selected controls are imposed on users and systems, security may be viewed 
as a hindrance to the organisation’s objectives (Hansche, Berti & Hare 2004). 
For an information security professional to make a positive contribution to the 
organisational goals, a good understanding of the organisation’s strategy is critical. This 
requires such professionals to be able to read and understand high-level business strategy 
and be able to translate the strategy into tangible technical and administrative security 
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controls. Information security is an area that is constantly changing and thus requires 
methods and solutions that ensure adaptations to new and ever-changing information 
security threats, countermeasures and the global business landscape (Dlamini, Eloff & Hone 
2009). However, the new emphasis is on understanding the broader security risks so that 
security controls can address these risks (Williams 2007). It then becomes imperative that, as 
the business evolves, so must the information security controls.  
3.2.2 Approaches in the implementation of information security 
 
Depending on the culture and capability of the organisation, different approaches can be 
used in the implementation of information security controls within an organisation. This 
does, however, require that the organisation adopt certain principles that assist in the 
advancement of information security objectives. From a systems and applications point of 
view, three major principles are applicable (Julisch et al. 2011): 
 Defence in depth – never relying on one control alone 
 Automation – seeking to automate controls as much as possible 
 Fail-safe – controls that break should default to a state that protects assets even 
though this may reduce usability or performance. 
Information security professionals need to assess the environment and implement controls 
suitable for the organisation. However, one of the generally accepted approaches in 
implementing security involves identifying what must be protected, determining what it 
should be protected from, determining the likelihood of the threats, implementing controls 
that can protect the assets in a cost-effective manner and having the means to continually 
review the process and apply corrective measures or improvements where weaknesses are 
identified (Fites, Kratz & Brebner 1988). This approach will now be discussed briefly below. 
(1) Identifying what must be protected 
Information security professionals must, firstly, identify which information assets of the 
organisation have to be protected, the location of the information and in what form 
(physical or electronic) it exists. Executives make use of such information on a daily basis to 
make decisions that seek to bring the organisation closer to its goals. To make these 
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decisions, executives need information that is kept confidential and accurate, as well as 
available in a timely manner (Posthumus, Von Solms 2004).   
Information security professionals need the involvement and cooperation of the business in 
identifying the information assets that need protection. Ultimately, these information assets 
belong to the business and, as such, the business must be in a position to know what 
information assets need protection.   
(2) Determining what information assets should be protected from 
Once information assets have been identified, the threats to these assets must be identified. 
A threat is an event that has the potential to cause loss or harm to computing resources such 
as hardware, software, data or communications networks (Pfleeger, Pfleeger 2002). 
Consequently, threats applicable to the processing system in question can be identified on 
the basis of the vulnerabilities within the information processing system. For a threat to 
cause damage to the information asset, it needs to exploit its vulnerability.  
Threats come in three forms (Chaula, Yngstrom & Kowalski 2005):  
 Natural phenomena (act of God). These include natural disasters such as volcanic 
eruptions and floods. They also include manmade catastrophes such as terrorism and 
power outages.  
 Technical nature (system malfunction). Such threats exist as a result of organisations’ 
dependence on IT systems. Examples include hardware and software defects, viruses 
and buffer overflow.  
 Human activities. Humans can cause damage to the organisation’s information assets 
either accidentally or maliciously.  
 
(3) Determining the likelihood of the threats 
Threats are not all equal. Some threats are more likely to occur and cause harm than others. 
This implies that threats should be rated according to their likelihood of occurrence. In line 
with this activity, the impact of each threat causing harm must be identified. For the 
purposes of addressing the threats, it is important that threats with a high likelihood of 
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causing harm and with a high resultant impact must be on top of the list. This exercise helps 
in terms of the prioritisation of controls.   
(4) Implementation of controls to protect the assets in a cost-effective manner 
The cost of implementing security controls must be commensurate with the value of the 
information asset being protected. This is to ensure that the controls being put in place do 
not result in over or under protection of information assets.   
Since organisations do not have unlimited budgets, information security professionals are 
sometimes faced with challenges in obtaining the funding required for implementing 
security controls. The professionals must compete with other business units in the 
organisation in obtaining approval for their budgets. In order to convince senior 
management successfully, the budget requirements for information security should be 
aligned with the vision and mission statements, the business goals, the legal obligations, the 
overall risk appetite and the policy statements of the organisation (Dlamini, Eloff & Hone 
2009). 
(5) Continually review the process and implement corrective measures or improvements 
where weaknesses are identified 
As circumstances change it becomes necessary to review the effectiveness of the controls 
put in place and to identify any gaps. Over time, some information may lose value and 
therefore require less and cheaper controls. The opposite is also true; some information may 
gain value over time thereby requiring stronger controls than initially implemented.   
3.2.3 Information security programme 
 
Once information security professionals know what information assets there are to protect, 
where they are located and in what form, an information security programme must be 
formulated. An information security programme should cover aspects such as strategies 
(prevention, detection, verification and response), tools, processes, people, roles and 
dimensions (governance, operations, architecture) (Onsett International Corporation 2001). 
These must be underpinned by the items that form the foundation of the information 
security programme, which include information security policy. 
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A typical information security programme would look like the one depicted in the diagram 
below: 
 
Figure 3.1 Information security programme (Lilley 2009) 
 
The above figure shows that the first step in the implementation of information security is 
the creation of a security policy and the approval thereof. A security policy acts as a blueprint 
for an organisation’s security programme and provides the foundation on which to build 
such as programme (Harris 2005). A good security policy should incorporate both the users’ 
needs for accurate and reliable information, as well as the business’s needs for achieving its 
strategic objectives (Höne, Eloff 2002). This approach helps in that it encourages users to buy 
in to the security policy, while at the same time meeting the organisation’s strategic goals. 
Moreover, a security policy must take into account the legislative, statutory and regulatory 
requirements the organisation must fulfil as part of its operations. In short, a security policy 
is the primary embodiment of organisational strategy, guiding the decisions made by users, 
administrators and managers, and informing those individuals of their security 
responsibilities (FFIEC 2006).  
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Once the security policy has been established, the next step is the formalisation of 
responsibilities in the area of security. When defining the responsibilities of security, 
principles for the segregation of duties must be enforced. Accordingly, the security policy 
must define responsibilities at the highest level. 
Further, security guidelines and standards that support the security policy must be 
developed. As these items are developed, the security programme increases in granularity 
by developing baselines and configurations for the chosen controls and methods (Harris 
2005). 
Once the baseline in the form of a security policy, security and responsibilities, security 
standards and guidelines has been established, the next blocks of the security programme 
become more technical and detailed. These include the establishment of security 
management processes, risk management, technical security architecture, detailed technical 
procedures and asset classifications. These items ensure the proper implementation of 
security requirements as defined in a security policy. 
Policies, standards and other security initiatives need to be communicated to the users. To 
achieve this, training and user awareness campaigns must be undertaken to ensure that 
users understand their security responsibilities, as well as how to act when faced with 
various security situations. In the case of hacking, for example, although technical solutions 
may be implemented in an organisation, if users are not vigilant in their activities hackers 
can count on their ignorance and exploit that weakness. Users must be encouraged to be 
constantly vigilant in order to ensure that they do not forget their security responsibilities. 
This promotes the responsible use of computers within organisations and minimises the risk 
of unauthorised access and irresponsible behaviour (Mears, Von Solms 2004). 
Finally, a security programme must have the means and facilities for reporting the success 
and failures of established security programmes. Moreover, its reporting facility must be 
able to identify security violations and breaches. Good information security reports assist 
management to understand the organisation’s security position and empower management 
to make informed decisions regarding information security. Reporting also assists in the 
identification of security gaps and, as a result, ensures that information security 
professionals are able to beef up security in areas of concern. Based on the results of 
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reports, policies may be updated to keep abreast of information security trends occurring 
within an organisation. 
The security programme is a living process; accordingly, it needs to be planned for, 
implemented, measured and updated as required. It is therefore essential that senior 
executive management buy in to any security programme. 
3.2.4 What does business expect from information security? 
 
Organisations create high-level strategies and visions to take them closer to their strategic 
goals. In terms of these strategies, the onus then falls on the each business unit within the 
organisation to establish and implement plans that contribute to the overall organisational 
strategy. Information security professionals should do the same. 
In financial and telecommunications sectors, where many stringent regulations are imposed, 
IT security professionals are required to meet high expectations on an ongoing basis (ISACA 
2008a). Such expectations emanate from four stakeholders: customers, regulators, 
management and shareholders. These stakeholder expectations include the following 
(Symantec 2008): 
 Customers. Current and future customers demand flawless delivery of innovative 
services in the belief that their money is safe and their confidential information 
protected. 
 
 Regulators. Regulators and the public require orderly markets and transactions, and 
rapid, transparent response to public concerns. 
 
 Management and shareholders. These parties expect smooth operations, prudent 
management of IT and business risks, and fast, confident responses to growth, 
change or crisis. 
It is clear that all the requirements expected of IT professionals relate directly to information 
security and, as such, information security professionals should be able to translate these 
into elements that have to be delivered in their own programmes. They need to identify and 
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apply the relevant controls to ensure that expectations are met from an information security 
perspective. 
To assist the organisation in achieving the typical requirements as indicated above, some of 
the attributes expected of information security professionals include the following 
(Fitzgerald, Krause 2008): 
 
 Can manage the creation and implementation of enterprise-wide solutions. 
 Have a thorough understanding of the business. The security position must be 
tailored to the specific needs and risk appetites of the business.  
 Are aware of regulatory/legal/privacy implications. Information security professionals 
need to understand the impact that these requirements have on the information 
security programmes they are implementing. 
 Develop relationships, communicate and sell ideas effectively to senior management.  
 Can apply a technology risk management approach. They must understand that 
information security is not a technology issue; it is a business issue. 
The attributes listed above indicate that an information security professional must be 
someone who is able to think both at the strategic and the technical levels. In their plans, 
information security professionals should incorporate all the business requirements. The 
alignment of security plans with organisational plans is very important if security 
programmes are to be successful in an organisation.  
3.3 ICT security auditors 
 
The role of ICT security auditors is to provide independent assurance to the organisation that 
the controls implemented are indeed correctly implemented and that they serve the 
purpose they were designed for. Auditors must be independent of any influence, be it 
internal or external to the organisation. Corporate governance is formed by, among other 
things, internal audit, external audit, senior management and the board (Rose, Norman 
2008). Auditors must report to the audit committee of the board of directors in order to 
avoid any conflict of interest (Chorafas 2008). Auditors are divided into two categories: 
internal auditors and external auditors. 
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3.3.1 Internal auditors 
 
Internal auditors are meant to remain independent in order to provide objective assurance 
and consulting activities designed to add value and improve an organisation’s operations. 
These auditors help the organisation to achieve its objectives through a systematic, 
disciplined approach to evaluating and improving the effectiveness of risk management 
control and governance processes (IIA 2010).  
The scope of internal auditors is broad and spans many areas including the following (COSO 
2004b): 
 Internal control systems 
 Adherence to legal and regulatory requirements 
 Risk management policies and practices 
 Financial information systems 
 Testing of transactions’ observance of limits 
 Testing of compliance with regulatory requirements  
 Special investigations 
This just goes to show how critical the role of the internal auditor is. In addition, before 
auditors undertake any audit engagement it is important that they have a general 
understanding of the environment being audited, as well the technologies and systems being 
used in the organisation. 
3.3.2 External auditors 
 
The role of external auditors is to evaluate the reasonableness of financial statements, thus 
determining whether the financial statements properly reflect the performance of the 
business (Carrol 2006).  
External auditors are usually tasked with performing the following functions (Chorafas 
2008): 
 Evaluate the work of internal auditors. 
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 Examine the organisation’s accounting principles and its compliance 
with them. 
 Analyse financial reports and disclosures. 
 Test the assets, liabilities, revenues and expenses. 
 Pay particular attention to high-risk areas.  
 Appraise the performance of internal controls and their adequacy 
under stress conditions. 
As can be noted, external auditors must, among other things, assess the work done by 
internal auditors. Then, depending on the outcomes of the evaluation of internal audit work, 
external auditors can perform further tests to satisfy themselves. To perform such tests, 
external auditors must possess vast skills related to consulting, performance analysis, 
operational review and information technology. 
Nowadays, information systems are so pervasive and fundamental to a company’s 
performance and, as such, evaluation of IT risks and controls, that they are crucial to 
company performance (Gonzales et al. 2004). This means that auditors must place reliance 
on the underlying systems that store, transport and process the transactions, as, if the 
controls on these systems are weak, auditors may lose confidence in the integrity of the 
information being processed and produced by those systems. 
3.3.3 Auditing bodies and standards 
 
The work of auditors is governed by various bodies that lay down rules and regulations that 
their members must abide by. At the international level, auditors and accountants are 
subjected to regulations established by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards 
Board, which falls under the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC 2011). In South 
Africa, auditors are regulated by the Independent Regulatory Body for Auditors (IRBA) (SA 
Government 2005). Further, ICT security auditors and information systems auditors are 
regulated by a body called the Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) 
(ISACA 2008b). Internal auditors, on the other hand, must adhere to the rules and 
regulations set out by the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) (IIA 2010). In addition, the 
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general standards that govern the audit profession are the General Accepted Auditing 
Standards (GAAS) (GAAS 2010).  
There are other bodies and standards, but the scope of this study will focus only on the ones 
mentioned above. These will now be briefly discussed in the following sections. 
3.3.3.1 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) 
 
The IAASB is an independent standard-setting body that serves the public interest by setting 
high-quality international standards for auditing, quality control, review and other assurance 
and related services, and by facilitating the convergence of international and national 
standards (IFAC 2011). In doing so, the IAASB seeks to enhance the quality and uniformity of 
practice throughout the world and strengthen public confidence in the global auditing and 
assurance profession (IFAC 2011). 
3.3.3.2 Independent Regulatory Body for Auditors (IRBA) 
 
The IRBA was established by the Auditing Profession Act of 2005 (SA Government 2005). The 
objective of the IRBA is to protect the financial interests of the South African public and 
international investors in South Africa through the effective and appropriate regulation of 
audits conducted by registered auditors, in accordance with internationally recognised 
standards and processes (IRBA 2011). 
The statutory Committee for Auditor Ethics assists the Board in determining what 
constitutes improper conduct by registered auditors by developing rules and guidelines for 
professional ethics, including a Code of Professional Conduct for Registered Auditors and 
Rules Regarding Improper Conduct (IRBA 2011). 
3.3.3.3 Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) 
 
The ISACA is the body that sets standards and guidelines applicable to information systems 
auditors. Some of the standards set by ISACA include the following (ISACA 2008a):  
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 Audit charter. The purpose of an audit charter is to document the purpose, 
responsibility, authority and accountability of information systems (IS) 
auditors 
 Independence. The auditor must be professionally and organisationally 
independent. 
 Professional competence. Auditors must be professionally competent and 
have the skills required to run an audit. 
There are many other standards defined by ISACA and to which the IS auditor must conform; 
failure to do so may lead to disciplinary action and possibly having membership suspended 
or revoked by the body. 
3.3.3.4 The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) 
 
The Institute of Internal Auditors serves the interests of internal auditors throughout the 
world (IIA 2010). Most of the standards defined by this institute are similar to those defined 
by ISACA. The purpose of the IIA standards is the following (IIA 2010): 
 Delineate basic principles that represent the practice of internal auditing.  
 Provide a framework for performing and promoting a broad range of value-added 
internal auditing.  
 Establish the basis for the evaluation of internal audit performance.  
 Foster improved organisational processes and operations.  
In total, the body has about 17 standards statements which include:  
 Purpose, authority and responsibility 
 Independence and objectivity 
 Proficiency and due professional care 
 Quality assurance and improvement programme 
3.3.3.5 General Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) 
 
Auditors must adhere to the principles of the Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) 
(GAAS 2010). The GAAS groups its rules into three areas: 
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 General standards 
 Standards of field work 
 Standards of reporting 
General standards require that the audit be performed by persons with adequate technical 
training and proficiency, characterised by an independent mental attitude and being capable 
of exercising due professional care in audits. This includes overall performance, the 
discovery process, and preparation of the audit report (Chorafas 2008). 
Standards of field work call for the audit to be adequately planned, supervision of auditors 
to be properly exercised, and a proper study and evaluation of existing internal controls to 
be made to determine the audit scope and the procedures to be performed during field 
work. Further, sufficient evidence must be obtained to formulate an independent factual 
opinion regarding internal controls (Chorafas 2008). 
GAAS standards of reporting focus on the matters confronting internal and external 
auditors, such as whether records and other related artefacts are presented in accordance 
with GAAS. The application of GAAS in audited accounting records, statements and reports 
must achieve the fundamental objective of accounting, which is to provide reliable financial 
information about the economic resources and obligations of the organisation (Chorafas 
2008). 
3.3.4 Key items and tools for auditors 
 
Similar to information security professionals, auditors need to approach their projects in a 
structured way. The following are key items that auditors must be able to understand and 
use effectively (Gonzales et al. 2004): 
 Audit preparation – includes identification of the skills and resources required as well 
as sources of information.  
 Audit objectives – formal statements describing the purposes of the audit. 
 Data gathering – involves determining and implementing the sample selection 
approach. It also involves the means through which the data will be collected. 
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 Audit programme – a plan for reviewing and testing controls on each subject area. 
The controls are tested using the data collected. 
 Audit tests – these are designed to verify the functional accuracy, efficiency and 
control of the area being audited. 
 Use of audit tools – tools such as computer-assisted audit techniques (CAATs) are 
used by auditors to automate the process of evaluating large amounts of data 
spanning different systems. 
 Conclusions – these are the opinions auditors formulate on the basis of the 
documented evidence before them. 
 Findings – these are formal statements that highlight the weaknesses identified in 
terms of the controls implemented or not implemented by the organisation. 
 Recommendations – these are corrective measures that auditors propose for 
resolving any problems identified by the findings. 
 The audit report – this is the final document presented to the client after the audit 
has been concluded.  
 Working papers – these include the systematic documentation of evidence compiled 
by the auditor thereby allowing him/her to arrive at a conclusion. 
 Follow-up of audit recommendations – these are follow-up reviews to evaluate the 
progress made by the organisation in addressing the audit findings. 
3.3.5 Continuous auditing 
 
Owing to the constant changes taking place in systems within organisations, and the amount 
of information that is produced by business processes and transactions, auditors are faced 
with the challenge of how best to pick up irregularities before a large amount of damage is 
done. This then means that auditors must identify and implement ways that will provide 
assurance on an ongoing basis. To achieve this, auditors must look for technologies that 
provide continuous auditing.  
While there are benefits to be extracted from implementing continuous auditing, there are 
nevertheless challenges involved in implementing it. Organisations run different systems on 
different platforms, including legacy systems. Therefore, the information being processed is 
also stored in different formats. This setup then limits the ability of the continuous auditing 
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solutions because data from different systems and in different formats must be standardised 
first before being analysed and presented. This consequently becomes an expensive process 
and is time consuming (Flowerday, Blundell & Von Solms 2006). 
3.4 Regulatory environment 
 
As noted earlier, information security forms part of corporate governance. Hence, corporate 
governance requirements oblige the organisation to comply with all laws and regulations 
that the organisation is operating under. In line with international trends, South Africa is 
paying increased attention to information protection and privacy issues. The enforcement of 
such regulatory requirements is performed by regulatory officials, who should have 
authority and integrity, as well as the necessary resources (OECD 2004).  
As part of corporate governance, information security also forms part of enterprise risk 
management. Regulatory officials influence enterprise risk management for many 
organisations, either through requirements to establish internal controls or through the 
examination of particular entities. Regulatory influence happens in two ways: firstly, officials 
establish rules that provide the impetus for management to ensure that risk management 
and control systems meet the minimum statutory and regulatory requirements; and, 
secondly, pursuant to the examination of a particular entity, they provide information used 
by the entity to apply enterprise risk management, and make recommendations and 
sometimes directives to management regarding needed improvements (COSO 2004b). 
Today, law makers are recognising the importance of information and the risks that face it. 
To address risks, various laws have been enacted locally and internationally and they need to 
be complied with. The challenge, however, is that various laws across different countries are 
inconsistent and are often incompatible (Sundt 2006). This then presents a special challenge 
for multinational companies which operate in different countries and, thus, by extension, 
need to comply with the laws of those countries. A very small number of laws and 
regulations prescribe how compliance is to be achieved; consequently, the onus falls on 
organisations to ascertain how they are going to meet the requirements of the laws and 
regulations. Such organisations must implement a correct, effective and affordable mix of 
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controls that ensures that the business meets its objective while ensuring that compliance 
with the law can be demonstrated (Sundt 2006). 
3.4.1 Types of regulation 
 
There are two types of regulation, namely, mandatory and advisory (Sundt 2006). 
Mandatory laws and regulations are those that must be complied with at all costs without 
exception. Failure to comply with these may lead to criminal charges being laid against the 
directors and/or senior management of the organisation concerned. Advisory regulations, on 
the other hand, are those that exist but are not legally enforceable. They may, however, 
influence the laws and failure to comply with them may exacerbate problems in any legal 
challenge (Sundt 2006). Complying with advisory regulations can also provide a competitive 
advantage for an organisation. In South Africa, for instance, King III is a code that prescribes 
how corporate governance should be implemented, but the code is not legally enforceable. 
There are cases where a national law is enforced outside its strict legal jurisdiction. This is 
referred to as extra-territoriality (Sundt 2006). For example, the requirements of the law 
may be that notification be made of any security breach affecting the information of citizens 
of a particular country by any company anywhere in the world (Sundt 2006). 
3.4.2 Regulatory bodies 
 
Regulatory bodies enforce legal or regulatory requirements and compliance in this regard is 
usually mandatory. These bodies exist in various forms and have different focus areas. When 
information security professionals implement controls in an organisation, they need to be 
aware of the laws they must comply with and that regulatory bodies can at any time come 
and inspect the status of the implemented information security controls. Ideally, information 
security professionals should include legal counsel in decisions regarding information 
security and privacy and the formulation of policies around such matters (Fitzgerald, Krause 
2008).  
In the same vein, auditors must take into account existing laws affecting the organisation 
they are performing audits for. This then requires a mutual understanding among the three 
role players with regard to information security requirements. 
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South Africa, through its various laws and regulations, has seen the establishment of a 
number of regulatory bodies, as well as the existence of regulatory officials. The regulatory 
bodies that have an impact on the role players forming part of this study are discussed in the 
following sections.  
3.4.2.1 COMSEC 
 
One of the major players in the protection of information within the organs of state is 
COMSEC. COMSEC was established as the institutional authority to, among other things 
(Padayachie 2008)  
 identify and protect the critical infrastructure  
 protect and secure critical electronic communications of the organs of state against 
unauthorised access or technical, electronic or any other related threats  
On an annual basis, COMSEC officials send questionnaires with a list of security questions to 
the various organs of state. The purpose of these questionnaires is to identify the security 
controls that are implemented within the organisation. Based on the answers COMSEC 
receives to the questionnaires, it may decide to visit a particular state organ to obtain more 
evidence.  
3.4.2.2 Cyber inspectors  
 
The ECT Act prescribes the appointment of cyber inspectors by the Department of 
Communications (DOC). These cyber inspectors may monitor internet websites in the public 
domain and investigate whether cryptography and authentication service providers comply 
with the relevant provisions of the Act. Inspectors have the powers of search and seizure 
subject to obtaining a warrant. They can also assist the police or other investigative bodies 
on request (Michalson, Hughes 2005).  
3.4.2.3 National Cyber Security Advisory Council 
 
In February 2010, the DOC released a draft cyber security policy document to the public for 
comment. The policy provides for the establishment of a National Cyber Security Advisory 
Council (NCAC) to coordinate all cyber security initiatives at the strategic level (Department 
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Of Communications 2010). Among the tasks allocated to the NCAC is to assess the state of 
national cyber security, determine needs and advise on appropriate responses and priorities. 
The council must also provide oversight regarding the implementation of national cyber 
security initiatives and structures. 
3.4.2.4 National Computer Security Incident Response Teams  
 
The draft cyber security policy further provides for the establishment of a National 
Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT), whose role will be to identify, analyse, 
contain, mitigate and report the outcome of threats to the relevant parties. This team will be 
established by the DOC in conjunction with relevant government departments, the private 
sector and civil society (Department Of Communications 2010).  
3.4.3 Private regulatory bodies 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, through public–private partnerships there are other bodies that 
play a role in one form or another in the information security regulatory environment. These 
bodies, which are listed below, were discussed in chapter 2 because of the role they play in 
IT and financial matters: 
 The South African Fraud Prevention Service (SAFPS), whose role is to assist in the 
protection against impersonation and identify theft. 
 South African Banking Risk Information Centre (SABRIC), which provides intelligence 
support to banks against crime including e-crime. 
 Business Against Crime South Africa (BAC), which focuses on commercial crimes 
including those committed using IT systems. 
 
3.5 How does each role player contribute in the various 
stages of information security implementation?  
 
(Dagada, Eloff & Venter 2009) have come up with a model based on the diagram below, 
which is meant to ensure that organisations meet the legal requirements when formulating 
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their information security strategies and implementing the same. The diagram consists of 
blocks 1 to 8; the actions that occur within each block will be discussed next.  
 
 
Figure 3.2 Model for ensuring information security complies with regulatory requirements 
(Dagada et al. 2009) 
Block 1: First and foremost, an ICT strategic pronouncement should be made. This is made 
by senior management at the organisation’s corporate level. These ICT strategies have 
implications for the information security requirements.  
Block 2: The relevant legislation, codes and standards that must be complied with must be 
identified. This affects information security in particular since all information security 
initiatives must be in line with legislation and compliance requirements, as these are usually 
mandatory. 
Block 3: Once the compliance and regulatory requirements have been identified, they 
should be integrated into the ICT security plan. The purpose of the security plan is to ensure 
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that the organisation meets its objectives while at the same time complying with all 
applicable compliance and legislation requirements. 
Block 4–7: These blocks relate to the various stages through which policies progress, 
including the allocation of duties to particular units and the approval process, up to the point 
where each employee signs an acknowledgement of the approved policies. Importantly, user 
awareness should be integrated during these stages so that users will know what is expected 
of them and what the consequences of non-compliance are.  
Block 8: This is where the regulatory officials and the ICT auditors play a critical role in 
verifying the compliance of the organisation in terms of the policies and regulatory 
requirements. At this stage, information security professionals must monitor controls 
regularly and implement corrective measures in case of non-compliance. They must also use 
the feedback from ICT auditors and regulatory officials to improve the controls. This may 
require a review of the security plan with a view to updating it where necessary. 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
The discussion in this chapter has focused on the three role players involved in the 
implementation and evaluation of information security controls within an organisation. The 
three key role players were identified as information security professionals, ICT security 
auditors and regulatory officials. It was noted that since information security forms part of 
corporate governance, the same principles that are used to implement corporate 
governance must be used for information security. The coexistence of information security 
professionals, ICT security auditors and regulatory officials ensures that there are checks and 
balances which form the cornerstone of corporate governance. 
The roles of the three role players were discussed in detail, as well as the various approaches 
and methodologies each role player can use in executing their duties. The next chapter will 
examine the challenges that exist in the implementation and evaluation of information 
security requirements.  
             
 
Chapter 4 
Challenges in the Implementation and 
Evaluation of Information Security 
Requirements
Challenges in the Implementation and Evaluation of Information Security Requirements 
      









Status of Information 





Role Players In The Implementation 
And Evaluation Of Information 
Security 
Chapter 4: 
Challenges in the Implementation And 
Evaluation of Information Security 
Requirements 
FRAMEWORK LITERATURE REVIEW 
+ 1 
Chapter 5: Chapter 6: 
Current Information Security What Makes A Good Information 
Frameworks Security Framework? 
CONTRIBUTION 
Chapter 7: 
The SAlSA Framework 
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
Challenges in the Implementation and Evaluation of Information Security Requirements 
      




In the previous chapter, the focus was on the three role players (information security 
professionals, ICT security auditors and regulatory officials) that play a crucial role in the 
implementation and evaluation of information security controls. The discussion focused on 
their roles and responsibilities, as well as the standards that they adhere to. Accordingly, 
interaction among the role players is crucial in ensuring that they are aligned when 
initiatives are undertaken to implement and evaluate information security controls.  
The role players must understand and interpret information security requirements 
consistently in order to avoid any unnecessary misunderstanding and conflict that may arise 
owing to misalignments regarding the implementation and evaluation of information 
security controls. Such conflict could lead to delays in projects, and could also affect security, 
as parties may be pulling against each other instead of working together (National 
Computing Centre 2005). In addition, wastage of scarce resources, such as time and money, 
could occur since a lot of energy may be expended debating issues rather than putting the 
actual controls required to protect information into place (Tucci 2009).  
This chapter looks at challenges affecting the implementation and evaluation of information 
security controls. It discusses how the interpretation challenges among the role players lead 
to difficulties in the implementation of information security controls. It also covers factors 
such as money and skills shortages, information security trade-offs and communication 
barriers. 
4.2 Business information security 
 
The implementation of information security controls cannot happen in isolation from the 
other activities taking place in an organisation, as information security must be in line with 
the organisation’s goals (ISO/IEC 27002 2007). To this end, the implementation of security 
controls in an organisation must not hamper the day-to-day business operations.  
Role players must acknowledge and appreciate the resources involved in information 
security; these resources include people, process and technology (IT Governance Institute 
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2007a). The interactions among the role players have an influence on how information 
security is implemented and evaluated in an organisation (Hermason, Hill & Ivancevich 
2000). This interaction is influenced by culture, human factors and support, architecture and 
governance, as indicated in figure 4.1 below (ISACA 2009a). Information security 
professionals, ICT security auditors and regulatory officials must understand these complex 
factors as they are the ones who implement and evaluate information security controls.   
 
 
There is a general consensus among industry players that information security is not just a 
technology issue but also a business issue, which needs to be addressed at the highest levels 
of the organisation (IT Governance Institute 2006). In implementing an information security 
programme, the organisation is addressing business risk in ways that ensure that the 
business functions and strives. Aligning an information security programme to business 
requirements is a key element in putting in place solutions that address business risks 
(Onsett International Corporation 2001). Effective security management not only requires 
the selection of appropriate technology, but also organisational support, competent people 
and efficient processes (ISACA 2009a). 
Figure 4.1 The Business Model for Information Security (ISACA 
2009) 
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4.3 Information security requirements 
 
Information security requirements come in different forms and change over time as the 
organisation evolves. Furthermore, as systems evolve as a result of changes in their 
requirements and the environment in which they operate, security requirements need to be 
re-validated, or changed, to ensure an appropriate level of asset protection (ThesisTown 
2009). Examples of information security requirements include the following (Fitzgerald, 
Krause 2008, Gerber, Von Solms 2001): 
 Maintain confidentiality, integrity and availability of services. 
 Act competitively while being secure and meeting privacy and regulatory 
requirements. 
For any organisation to embark on implementing any information security initiative, it is 
critical that the information security requirements for the organisation be clearly articulated 
and understood as early as possible.  
4.3.1 Sources of information security requirements 
 
To properly define information security requirements, there must be a source of information 
that provides a basis for the decisions being made on information security goals. There are 
three sources of information security requirements (ISO/IEC 27002 2007, Fitzgerald, Krause 
2008): 
 Identification of information security risks that are unique to the organisation  
 Legal, statutory, regulatory and contractual obligations  
 Uniqueness of the organisation  
4.3.1.1 Identification of information security risks that are unique to the 
organisation  
 
Risk comprises three main components: the asset, a threat and the vulnerability of the asset 
to the threat (Gerber, Von Solms 2005). An asset is anything that has value to the 
organisation (ISO/IEC 13335 2004), while vulnerability is a weakness in the security system 
Challenges in the Implementation and Evaluation of Information Security Requirements 
      
Chapter 4   74  
 
that might be exploited to cause loss of or harm to the assets (Gerber, Von Solms 2005). On 
the other hand, a threat is the source or the circumstance that has the potential to cause 
loss or harm (Gerber, Von Solms 2005). Information is an asset of value to an organisation 
and, as a result, needs to be properly protected in order to ensure business continuity, 
minimise business damage, maximise return on investment (ROI) and exploit business 
opportunities (OregonGov 2009).  
During the risk assessment process, three components must be taken into account: the value 
of the information asset, the likelihood of a threat being realised and the vulnerability 
between two (Jackson, Hruska 1992). As discussed in the previous chapter, various tools and 
frameworks (both qualitative and quantitative) can be used to identify the risks unique to 
the organisation. 
The outcomes of the risk assessment exercise are the recommended information security 
controls that must be implemented based on the calculated risk values (Gerber, Von Solms 
2001). Each adverse event identified during the risk analysis exercise must have an impact 
associated with it, as well its likelihood of occurring. Each risk identified must be categorised 





Figure 4.2 Risk evaluation and analysis (Qayoumi & 
Woody 2005) 
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Based on figure 4.2 above, the risks that fall into category 4 (those with high probability & 
high impact) must receive immediate attention. These are the risks that, if realised, would 
have maximum impact. They also have the highest probability of occurring. Typically, the 
risks in category 4 would be placed on top of a priority list for addressing information 
security risks.    
The risks falling into category 1 (low probability & low impact) would be at the bottom of a 
list of the risks that need to be attended to. In fact, the organisation may find cost-saving 
opportunities by decreasing the degree of control or by assuming more risk (ISACA 2009b). It 
is important for information security professionals to understand which risks fall under the 
different categories in order to have a better understanding of the areas that should receive 
most of their efforts and resources.  
ICT security auditors should also understand which areas to focus on when performing their 
reviews so that they do not focus their efforts on areas that are of least importance and 
which information security professionals are not paying immediate attention to. In this 
regard, risk management helps ICT auditors in the following ways (ISACA 2008a): 
 It assists auditor in identifying the risks and threats to an ICT environment and the 
systems that would need to be addressed by management and system-specific 
controls. Identifying the different levels of risk may assist the auditor in making 
better selections of areas to examine (with bias towards high-risk areas).  
 It helps auditors in their evaluation of controls in audit planning. 
 It assists auditors in determining audit objectives. 
 It supports risk-based audit decision making. 
Risk management is also important for regulatory officials. As noted earlier, regulatory 
officials influence the risk management of many entities, either with requirements to 
establish internal controls or through examinations of particular entities (COSO 2004b). 
The first step in the risk assessment process is to collect information on the system (asset). 
This happens by looking at the characteristics of the asset in question. The next step requires 
the system security to be defined. Inputs to this step are the identification of the protection 
needs of the systems, as well as the criticality/sensibility of these needs. In the step that 
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follows, system threats and system vulnerability analyses are carried out. Once the system 
vulnerability analysis is complete, the likelihood of the threat being realised and other 
information like the severity/criticality of the impact are defined. These can be ranked 
according to ‘high’, ‘medium’ and ‘low’, which feeds into the rating using the table illustrated 
in figure 4.2. The final step is to produce a risk assessment report. This report contains 
findings and recommendations regarding any additional security controls. Information 
security professionals use this report to start the process of implementing security controls 
in an environment.   
4.3.1.2 Legal, statutory, regulatory and contractual obligations 
 
Standards for compliance, review, monitoring and oversight functions must be incorporated 
into the overall security infrastructure to ensure that all legal requirements are met (IIA 
2010). Every organisation, regardless of its size or the industry in which it operates, needs to 
comply with a number of governmental and external requirements related to computer 
system practices and controls, and to the manner in which computers, programs and data 
are stored and used (ISACA 2008a). Furthermore, business regulations can impact on the 
way data is processed, transmitted or stored. Any organisation should establish accurately 
which legal, regulatory or statutory requirements they are subject to in terms of their own 
business practices, their business partners and government (Gerber, Von Solms 2001). 
 
In South Africa, as discussed in chapter 2, many laws and regulations exist that have an 
effect on how information security is implemented. These include the ECT Act, COMSEC, 
RICA and King III. Accordingly, companies must find a balance between meeting their 
security goals while ensuring that the compliance with regulatory requirements is met. This 
means that, as information security requirements are being formulated, certain legal, 
statutory, regulatory and contractual obligations must be taken into account.  
Organisations using the services of counsel and legal advisors must understand and 
appreciate the legal requirements as they put into effect their information security 
programmes. The difficulty facing organisations is that few laws and regulations specify how 
compliance is to be achieved (Sundt 2006). It is then left up to organisations to decide on 
how they will go about achieving compliance. The result of this is that, in many cases, the 
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way in which legal and regulatory requirements are met depends more on people and 
procedures than on technical controls (Sundt 2006).  
Organisations that fail to address legal and regulatory issues will find themselves at a 
competitive disadvantage and may fall victim to ever more technologically sophisticated 
criminals. Listed companies will find their share value increasingly being tied to governance 
(good and bad), as the market becomes more aware of its relevance (IT Governance Institute 
2006). 
4.3.1.3 Uniqueness of the organisation 
 
Every organisation has unique vulnerabilities, imperatives and options requiring an individual 
security approach (International Chamber Of Commerce 2003). No two organisations are 
alike, therefore neither are their information security requirements. The uniqueness of an 
organisation relates to the principles, objectives, procedures and requirements it has 
adopted to process information in support of its business operations and processes 
(Anderson 2002). During the requirements analysis stage, the required levels of 
confidentiality, integrity and availability should be determined for the organisation. Once the 
organisation has decided how much security it requires, suitable controls can be identified 
that satisfy those requirements (Butler 2006). 
 
The organisation’s unique risks can be elicited from its strategy, enterprise architecture and 
applicable codes and the industry in which the organisation is operating. In terms of the 
industry, companies are often encouraged to meet the security standards of their particular 
industry or sector (International Chamber Of Commerce 2003). This not only saves the 
company the associated penalties and reputational risks, but it also gives them a competitive 
edge over competitors (Hermason, Hill & Ivancevich 2000).   
4.4 Factors affecting the implementation of information 
security controls 
 
The identification of legislation affecting information security and the development of 
information security strategies and policies, although important, are only the first steps in 
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the organisation’s information security programme. The next important step is the 
implementation of controls based on those documents. This is important because, for 
example, the policy/law may look good on paper, but if it cannot be enforced then its 
purpose is defeated. The enforcement and implementation of information security controls 
require a number of critical elements: money, time, skill (Hoffman 2007) and coordination. 
Information can also be looked at from different viewpoints: attackers versus defenders, 
security versus usability, or security as an afterthought (Owens 2009). These will now be 
looked at in detail to determine how they affect the implementation and enforcement of 




The protection of information assets creates new and unwanted costs, where costs are 
defined as expenditure on resources that detect and prevent security breaches (Anderson, 
Choobineh 2008). 
Organisations, however, have limited financial resources which must be spent on other areas 
in addition to investments on information security controls (Business Software Alliance 2003, 
Courtney 1982).   
To enforce information security controls, money is required to do the following (Anderson, 
Choobineh 2008, International Telecommunication Union 2008):  
 Put preventative measures in place. 
 Recruit and retain skilled people.  
 Investigate any breaches that occur.    
4.4.1.1 Putting preventive measures in place 
 
Preventive measures include controls such as properly configured technologies (e.g. firewalls 
and intrusion detection/prevention systems), user awareness, ongoing support and 
maintenance of information security systems.  
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4.4.1.2 Recruiting and retaining skilled people 
 
Information security is a complex subject that requires suitably trained people to implement 
security controls (ISACA 2009a, Trcek 2003, Von Solms, Von Solms 2004). Retaining such 
people is an expensive exercise, as there is always the risk that they will be poached by other 
companies, including international firms, as a result becoming more expensive to keep. 
4.4.1.3 Investigating a breach  
 
No matter how many preventive controls are in place, there can never be a 100% secure 
system and environment – there is always a residual risk. When a breach occurs, an 
investigation should follow into what actually happened and, based on the investigation 
results, further action can be taken.  
During such investigations, evidence must be produced and preserved for law enforcement 
agencies. Investigations are costly and financial resources have to be made available to 
ensure they are successful. Firstly, skilled people are required to conduct investigations 
related to information security breaches. Secondly, sophisticated technologies must be 
deployed to help with such investigations. The rapid evolution of technology and 
information security breach techniques mean that law enforcement agencies must 
continuously upgrade technical equipment and software tools (Powner 2005). Such 
equipment and tools are expensive. Moreover, the logs produced by systems can be 
voluminous and may need a huge amount of memory storage.  
4.4.2 Skills 
 
Regulatory officials find that maintaining a current understanding of new criminal techniques 
and technologies can be difficult. For example, law enforcement agents may be rerequired 
to extract forensic data from IT devices that have only been on the market for a few months. 
They must also keep abreast of innovative criminal techniques and approaches. In addition, 
criminals are increasing their use of encryption techniques, making it difficult to read what is 
inside a communication (Powner 2005). 
Challenges in the Implementation and Evaluation of Information Security Requirements 
      
Chapter 4   80  
 
After an investigation has been completed, it should be taken to courts if it is a criminal 
matter. This means that judges, lawyers and prosecutors must have the skills required to 
assess information security related cases. In addition, they must have both law enforcement 
and technical skills, including knowledge of various IT hardware and software and forensic 
tools. According to (Powner 2005), state and law enforcement agencies do not have the 
resources needed to hire investigators with the technical knowledge required to address 
information security crimes.  
4.4.3 Time 
 
To implement and enforce the law requires time. Generally, laws affecting systems require 
system changes, reconfiguration or the introduction of new technologies. Besides the 
required changes to the systems, the people of the country must acclimatise themselves to 
new laws and abide by their provisions before they can fully understand them. The time 
required for this could range from months to years. While this is taking place, attackers are 
not biding their time, they are busy launching attacks.  
4.4.4 Coordination 
 
Coordination and cooperation between different agencies, including the public and the 
private sectors, are of paramount importance. The reporting of information security related 
breaches is often hampered by the fact that companies are reluctant to report security 
breaches of their systems. According to (Powner 2005), the reasons for this include the 
following: 
 Financial market impacts. The stock and credit markets and bond rating firms react 
negatively to security breach announcements, which could raise the cost of capital to 
the affected organisation. Even firms that are privately held and are not active in 
public securities markets can be adversely affected if banks and other lenders judge 
them to be more risky than previously thought.  
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 Reputation or confidence effects. Negative publicity damages a reporting firm’s 
reputation or brand, and could cause customers to lose confidence, giving 
commercial rivals a competitive advantage.  
 
 Litigation concerns. If an organisation reports a security breach, investors, customers, 
and other stakeholders can use the courts to claim damages. If the organisation has 
been open in the past about previous incidents, plaintiffs may allege a pattern of 
negligence.  
 
 Signal to attackers. A public announcement alerts hackers to the fact that an 
organisation’s information security defences are weak and may inspire further 
attacks.  
 
 Inability to share information. Some private-sector entities want to share information 
about an incident with law enforcement and other entities; however, once the 
information becomes part of an ongoing investigation, their ability to share 
information may be limited.  
 Job security. IT personnel may fear for their jobs after an incident and seek to conceal 
the breach from senior management.  
 
 Lack of law enforcement action. If there is a perception that law enforcement entities 
fail to investigate cases reported to them, it could become a disincentive for 
reporting breaches in the future.  
 
 The borderless nature of breaches. The borderless nature of information security 
gives rise to its own unique challenges. It is usually very difficult to investigate and 
prosecute security breaches that cross national borders and to work with laws, legal 
procedures and law enforcement entities from multiple jurisdictions. Hackers can be 
physically located in one nation, direct their activities through computers at multiple 
nations, and store evidence of their activities on computers in yet another nation. 
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Furthermore, law enforcers from one country may be uncooperative with another 
country when investigations are being conducted and prosecutions sought.  
4.4.5 Attackers vs defenders 
 
Information security professionals are faced with many challenges as they try to protect the 
organisation’s assets. On the other hand, attackers have plenty of advantages on their side 
and these include the following (Owens 2009):  
 Attackers need to only ‘know’ one vulnerability, while defenders need to secure all 
entry points. 
 Attackers have unlimited time, while defenders work within time and cost 
constraints. 
4.4.6 Security vs usability 
 
Users always prefer to use a system that is easy to operate. However, information security 
controls may have the opposite effect on ease of use, for example (Owens 2009): 
 Overly or improperly secured systems can be difficult to use. 
 Complex and strong passwords can be difficult to remember. 
 Users prefer simple passwords. 
Providing adequate protection to information systems requires striking a balance between 
the security and the usability or productivity of the systems. Trying to strike such a balance 
requires stakeholders to make strategic decisions to achieve the desired level of security 
while trading off competing requirements such as costs, performance and usability (Liu, Yu & 
Mylopoulos 2002).  
4.4.7 Security as an afterthought 
 
One of the major challenges facing information security professionals is that security is often 
treated as an afterthought, or as optional, rather than being an integral part of a system’s 
hardware and software (Mouratidis, Giorgini & Manson 2005, Wilson 2008). As such, 
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security add-ons are often poorly integrated with the rest of the system and are seen as an 
impediment rather than an enabler (Tipton, Krause 2004). Even when security is an integral 
feature of a product, it may be poorly implemented (Wybourne, Austin & Palmer 2009). 
Adding security features after the system has been designed and implemented is usually 
very costly and often without any guarantee that the added security will work well to 
combat security threats. 
It is, however, important to note that (Owens 2009)  
 many developers and management think that security does not add any value and is 
negative to the user’s experience 
 addressing vulnerabilities just before or after a product is released is very expensive 
4.5 Information security controls and trade-offs 
 
Implementing security goals is not always a straightforward activity; it requires leadership 
and a sense of understanding of what needs to be delivered taking into account the 
budgetary and resource constraints. In this regard, information security professionals and 
management have to consider trade-offs and related issues when they scrutinise and make 
information security investment decisions (Dlamini, Eloff & Hone 2009). Information security 
goals are largely determined by understanding the following trade-offs (Qayoumi, Woody 
2005): 
 
 Services offered versus security provided. Each service offered to the users carries its 
own security risks. For some services the risk outweighs the benefit of the service, 
and information security professionals and business persons may choose to eliminate 
the service rather than secure it. 
 
 Ease of use versus security. As highlighted above, the easiest system to use is a 
system with no security at all, for example not requiring any sort of authentication 
such as passwords or any other security controls. The addition of security controls 
such as the requirement for passwords makes it less convenient to use but more 
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secure. Requiring device-generated, one-time passwords makes the system even 
more difficult to use but even more secure.  
 
 Cost of security versus risk of loss. There are many different costs associated with 
security: monetary, performance and ease of use. In addition, there are different 
types of risk: loss of privacy, loss of data and loss of service. Each type of cost must 
be weighed up against each type of loss. The security control being implemented 
must deliver some value to the business. As the organisations invest in information 
security initiatives, they have to assess the resultant business returns. Linking 
information security initiatives to financial investment may help organisations to 
evaluate cost/benefits and thus improve the effectiveness of management 
information security (Huang, Lee & Kao 2006).   
 
Determining the financial value of information assets has its own difficulties. The 
challenge is that information assets protected by information security controls are 
intangible capital, and their value is difficult to assess (Huang, Lee & Kao 2006). As 
organisational assets (information) continue to become more intangible, the 
requirements of due care in the protection of information assets will require greater 
attention and resources (IT Governance Institute 2006). Further, current models also 
tend to be static and simple while IT environments are continuously changing (IT 
Governance Institute 2006). This means that current models fail to provide insight on 
how the organisation changes or how the culture evolves and, as a result, what may 
or may not emerge.  
4.6 Communication barriers 
 
The language used by information security professionals and business managers sometimes 
differs. This is despite the fact that they are both pursing the same goal. Information security 
managers strive to ensure that their programmes help the enterprise meet its strategic and 
operational goals; however, this can be a difficult task, for instance when they (information 
security professionals) are speaking in terms of specific threats, risks, controls and 
technologies, while business managers are talking about cost, productivity and ROI (IT 
Governance Institute 2006). 
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The complexity of this cross-communication is compounded by the fact that security is often 
defined inconsistently throughout the business. For the financial manager, security may 
equate to minimising financial risk and loss, while to the sales manager it is ensuring that 
nothing interferes with sales efforts and achieving targets. Meanwhile, the legal department 
sees it as a function of regulatory compliance, while a board member regard it as protection 
from personal liability (IT Governance Institute 2006). Consequently, it is of the utmost 
importance that the various information security investments be measured and clarified for 
effectiveness if information security is to be implemented and managed properly.  
4.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter identified some of the key challenges in the implementation and evaluation of 
information security controls. These challenges result from a combination of issues. 
Moreover, information security is a complex subject that must be integrated into business 
activities. Accordingly, information security programmes must be based on a proper plan 
that involves performing risk assessment exercises and understanding the sources of 
information security requirements. To perform these activities, the role players are expected 
to possess a variety of skills that allows them to link business requirements and information 
security activities. 
Implementing information security requires the investment of resources such as money, 
time and human resources. These resources are limited and information security faces 
competition from other business operations that want a share of these resources. 
Identifying, recruiting and retaining skilled human resources in the area of information 
security is not an easy task.  
Reporting of security breaches does not happen often enough, thus the opportunity to share 
experiences on such breaches among different businesses and organisations is lost. Other 
matters affecting the implementation of information security include balancing security and 
usability, security being treated as an afterthought and communication barriers. 
Frameworks and standards have been developed to address the challenges facing 
organisations regarding information security implementation and evaluation. The next 
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chapter will look at the main frameworks and standards that currently exist. Each framework 
being studied will be evaluated to determine its main purpose, its strengths and its 
weaknesses. This will help in the formulation of a framework that does not duplicate the 
existing frameworks but instead builds on them in developing a new and improved 
framework. Chapter 5 will also include some elements of the literature review as well the 
framework components. 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter covered the challenges facing organisation with regard to 
implementation and evaluation of information controls. To resolve these challenges, 
organisations use information security frameworks to guide them on the controls they need 
to put in place in order to protect information assets in an organisation (Da Veiga, Eloff 
2007). Currently, there are plenty of frameworks that influence information security. These 
include ISO/IEC 27002, and the standards of good practice for information security by the 
Information Security Forum (ISF), the Control Objectives for Information and Related 
Technology (COBIT) and the Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL). Different 
frameworks are applicable to the different levels of an information security programme. The 
levels, illustrated in figure 5.1 below, are strategic, tactical and operational (technical) 
(Garigue, Stefaniu 2003, Von Solms, Von Solms 2006a). 
 
Figure 5.1 Security model (Von Solms & Von Solms 2006a) 
This chapter focuses on the existing frameworks that influence information security and 
their importance. The discussion seeks to establish the objectives of each framework, 
including its strengths and weaknesses. This chapter will also determine whether each 
framework appeals to all or just some of the role players (information security professionals, 
ICT security auditors and regulatory officials). Understanding this will provide the necessary 
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input for formulating a new and comprehensive framework that will be used by all three 
role players to implement and evaluate information security controls. 
5.2 The importance of information security frameworks 
 
An organisation’s objectives should be viewed in terms of four key dimensions, namely, 
strategic, operations, reporting and compliance (COSO 2004b). The strategic dimension 
relates to high-level goals, while the operations dimension relates to the effectiveness and 
efficiency of an organisation’s operational processes. Further, the reporting dimension 
includes the capability of the organisation to report to internal and external stakeholders, 
while the compliance dimension is more concerned about the capability of the organisation 
to abide by the applicable laws and regulations and its need to do so (COSO 2004b). 
With information security being a critical area in an organisation, it becomes important for it 
to be incorporated into the strategic, operational, reporting and compliance dimensions of 
the organisation’s objectives. Following this approach ensures that information security 
becomes an integral part of the internal controls of the organisation. This approach further 
ensures that the expectations of the three role players are attended to and accommodated 
in the organisation’s goals and objectives. Accordingly, the interests of information security 
professionals are focused on strategic and operational dimensions; the interests of auditors 
are particularly focused on reporting dimensions; while the focus of regulatory officials is 
inclined towards compliance.  
To ensure that the organisation’s information security needs are met and that the 
regulatory requirements are incorporated in information security related activities, the use 
of best practice frameworks should be strongly considered, as they help guide organisations 
in establishing effective governance (Lessing 2008). Frameworks also play a huge role in 
ensuring that IT resources are aligned with the organisation’s objectives, and that the 
organisations  information meet quality, fiduciary and security requirements (IT Governance 
Institute 2008a).  
The adoption of a framework contributes to the quick implementation of good practices and 
avoids lengthy delays in creating and agreeing on new approaches that simply reinvent the 
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wheel (IT Governance Institute 2008a). This then contributes positively to ensuring that 
organisations approach information security in a structured manner. Having a framework 
goes a long way in embedding information security in the four dimensions of the 
organisation’s objectives. 
5.3 Types of framework 
 
Depending on the objectives involved, frameworks have varying appeal to different role 
players. For example, one framework may appeal to information security professionals but 
not necessarily to ICT security auditors or vice versa. This may be as a consequence of the 
fact that each framework is developed to meet a particular need and therefore has a 
particular focus. Therefore, frameworks vary in terms of objectives, steps, structure and 
level of application (Saleh, Alfantookh 2011).  
There are four types of framework that have an impact on information security. Firstly, 
there are generic frameworks that are high level in nature (e.g. COBIT). These frameworks 
focus on ‘what’ must be done rather than on ‘how’ it must be done (Furner, Cheney 2008). 
They are strong in providing the high-level integration required to ensure the cohesion of 
various components of information security programmes. Such frameworks are generally 
strategic in nature. 
The second type of framework comprises those that are more detailed and technical in 
nature (e.g. ITIL). These frameworks provide the guidelines on ‘how’ things should be done 
(Furner, Cheney 2008) and are not as abstract as the high-level frameworks. These detailed 
frameworks are more oriented to the operational aspects of information security. 
The third type of framework consists of those that are compliance focused (e.g. Basel II) 
(Furner, Cheney 2008). These are established by regulators to help organisations comply 
with certain regulations.  
The final type of framework discussed here comprises those that consist of high-level 
guidelines (Furner, Cheney 2008). These are broad in nature and may focus on an area that 
spans many disciplines, for example the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO), 
which focuses on risk management in general. COSO can be used by different disciplines, 
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including IT, finance and law. Such frameworks are not necessarily IT focused but have an 
impact on IT. They can be used by information security professionals to, for instance, 
develop their own frameworks based on the principles of the high-level guideline 
frameworks. ICT security auditors can adopt such frameworks to assist in formulating their 
audit programmes.  
5.4 Current and common frameworks and standards  
 
There are many frameworks related to information security that can be used by 
organisations in conjunction with standards to implement and evaluate security controls. A 
standard is rigid and specifies one way of doing things (best practices) and these must be 
followed exactly as specified (Olivia 2011, Nair 2009). A framework, on the other hand, is 
flexible, and is not defined by a step-by-step process. Frameworks define the boundaries and 
the system, but not the method itself (Olivia 2011, Nair 2009).  
For the purposes of this study, examples of both standards and frameworks will be looked 
at. However, the outcome of the research will be a framework, not a standard. The new 
framework will be flexible and adaptable to the various scenarios, and based on the needs 
and circumstances experienced by the role players.  
This study will not look at all standards and frameworks related to or having an impact on 
information security, but will instead focus on the commonly used standards and 
frameworks. The frameworks examined in this chapter are spread across various types as 
discussed on section 5.3 above (i.e. the “what”, “how”, compliance and high level guideline 
frameworks). The frameworks chosen also touch on different aspects of information 
security, for example governance, risk management and compliance. 
The common standards and frameworks that can be used in the implementation of 
information security include COBIT, ISO/IEC 27002, COSO, PCI-DSS, BASEL, ITIL, and the 
Standard of Good Practice for Information Security (FIC 2004, Spremic 2011, Ula, Ismail & 
Sidek 2011)(FIC 2004). 
In chapter 3 it was highlighted that risk management is one of the key components of 
information security. To this end, frameworks with a particular focus on risk management 
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will also be examined here. Common risk management frameworks that will be discussed in 
the following paragraphs include OCTAVE, CRAM, ISRAM and CORA (Vorster, Labuschagne 
2005).  
As architecture has an impact on information security (Eloff, Eloff 2005), some of the 
frameworks subsequently examined in this chapter, that is, SABSA and the Zachman 
Framework, are architecture oriented.  
The various frameworks and standards will be briefly discussed in the next few paragraphs. 
5.4.1 ISO/IEC 27002 
 
ISO/IEC 27002 is a comprehensive set of controls comprising best practices in information 
security (Trinckes 2009). This framework focuses on business, management, human 
resources and technology aspects to ensure that an efficient information security 
management programme is created (Trinckes 2009). The ISO 27002 framework defines 133 
security controls under the following 11 focus areas (ISO/IEC 27002 2007): 
 Security policy 
 Organisational security 
 Asset classification and control 
 Personnel security 
 Physical and environmental security 
 Communications and operations management 
 Access control 
 Systems development and maintenance 
 Incident response 
 Business continuity 
 Compliance 
ISO/IEC 27002 is a useful tool for information security professionals for driving and 
implementing their information security programmes.  
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5.4.2 The Standard of Good Practice for Information Security by Information 
Security Forum 
The Information Security Forum (ISF) produces the Standard of Good Practice for 
Information Security, which seeks to address information security from a business 
perspective (ISF 2007). The ISF is a membership-based organisation and the standard is 
targeted at members of the organisation, although non-members can obtain it for a fee.  
The standard is aligned with other security-related standards such as ISO/IEC 27002 and 
Cobit (ISF 2007). The development of the standard is based on three main activities: an 
extensive work programme involving the expertise of a full-time ISF management team, 
analysis; and the integration of information security-related standards (e.g. ISO 27002) as 
well as the involvement of ISF members (ISF 2007). 
The standard is aimed at major national and international organisations. The standard’s 
target audience is information security managers, business managers, IT managers, IT audit 
managers and outsource providers (ISF 2007). It covers the following aspects of information 
security: security management (enterprise-wide), critical business applications, computer 
installations, networks, systems development and end user environment (ISF 2007). 
5.4.3 The Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard (DSS) 
The PCI DSS can be defined as the following: 
A multifaceted security standard that includes requirements for security 
management, policies, procedures, network architecture, software design and other 
critical protective measures. This comprehensive standard is intended to help 
organisations proactively protect customer account data (PCI DSS 2011). 
The PCI DSS is governed by the PCI Security Standards Council. This standard is applied to 
any entity that processes, stores or transmit credit card information (Apani 2006). The three 
main groups affected by the standard are the following (Apani 2006): 
 Merchants. Retail stores that accept credit cards as payment. 
 Merchant banks or acquirers. Process transactions on behalf of merchants. 
 Service providers. Process, store, or transmit cardholder data on behalf of 
Visa members, merchants, or other service providers. 
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The standard has six focus areas (PCI DSS 2011): 
 Build and maintain a secure network. 
 Protect cardholder data. 
 Maintain a vulnerability management programme. 
 Implement strong access control measures. 
 Regularly monitor and test networks. 
 Maintain an information security policy. 
 
5.4.4 Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT)  
Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT®) is a set of good 
practices that spans a domain and process framework (IT Governance Institute 2007a). It 
seeks to bring together business risks, control needs and technical issues by providing good 
practices to structure and manage activities (Trcek 2003). COBIT is high level and is focused 
on what is required to ensure the adequate management and control of IT. 
COBIT is divided into four high-level domains, namely (IT Governance Institute 2007a):  
 Plan and organise (PO) – provides direction to solution delivery (AI) and service 
delivery (DS). 
 Acquire and implement (AI) – provides the solutions and passes them to be turned 
into services. 
 Deliver and support (DS) – receives the solutions and makes them usable for end 
users. 
 Monitor and evaluate (ME) – monitors all processes to ensure that the direction 
provided is followed. 
COBIT appeals to a broad range of users in particular executive management, business 
management, IT management and auditors (IT Governance Institute 2007a).  
5.4.5 Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) 
The ITIL is a comprehensive best practice framework that provides guidelines on a wide 
range of aspects of service management (Rudd 2004). The framework covers the complete 
spectrum of people, processes, products and use of partners. The primary focus of the ITIL 
framework is service management. By adopting the ITIL, the organisation ensures that it 
improves the focus on information security as a business and a service. Through this, 
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information security moves from being perceived as a cost centre or hindrance to business 
functions, to a critical service that must be aligned to the overall business strategy (Weil 
2010).  
The modules that form part of the ITIL framework are the following: Service Delivery, 
Service Support, ICT Infrastructure Management, Planning to Implement Service 
Management, Application Management, the Business Perspective and Security 
Management (Rudd 2004). 
5.4.6 Policy Framework for Interpreting Risk in e-Business Security (PFIRES) 
The PFIRES was initially developed for e-commerce activities. It now also involves the 
handling of security policy for all types of organisation engaged in computing and internet 
operations (Rees, Bandyopadhyay & Spafford 2003). It offers a possible starting point for 
understanding the impact of security policy on an organisation, and is intended to guide 
organisations in developing, implementing and maintaining their security policy (Rees, 
Bandyopadhyay & Spafford 2003). 
The PFIRES phases consist of assess, plan, deliver and operate (Eloff, Eloff 2005). The phases 
are summarised as follows (Rees, Bandyopadhyay & Spafford 2003): 
 Assess – involves the sub-steps of policy assessment and risk assessment (conducting 
security assessments and business risks). 
 Plan – focuses on activities such as policy development, security strategy creation 
and requirements definition. 
 Deliver – key activities include controls selection and definition, evaluation, testing 
and implementation of controls. 
 Operate – the sub-activities in this phase include monitoring of operations, ensuring 
compliance, identification of internal and external trends and management of 
events. 
 
5.4.7 Sherwood Applied Business Security Architecture (SABSA) 
SABSA is a framework and methodology for enterprise security architecture and service 
management. It is used for developing risk-driven enterprise information security 
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architectures and for delivering security infrastructure solutions that support critical 
business initiatives (SABSA 2011).  The primary characteristic of the SABSA framework is that 
everything must be derived from an analysis of the business’s requirements for security, in 
order to allow the organisation to develop and exploit new business opportunities (SABSA 
2011).   
The model is layered, with the top layer being the business requirements definition stage.  
At each of the lower layers a new level of abstraction and detail is developed through the 
definition of the conceptual architecture, logical services architecture, physical infrastructure 
architecture and, finally, to the lowest layer, the selection of technologies and products 
(component architecture) (SABSA 2011).  
SABSA comprises four phases: 
 Strategy and planning. This phase is about establishing context and focusing on 
activities, which include identifying business attributes, setting risk appetite, 
identifying risks and evaluating the risks (Sherwood, Clark & Lynas 2009).    
 
 Design. In the design phase, the SABSA framework is concerned with issues such 
as business processes, business systems, staffing models and the design of 
internal controls (Sherwood, Clark & Lynas 2009). 
 
 Implement. This phase addresses matters involving change management, project 
management and implementation of business systems, among other things 
(Sherwood, Clark & Lynas 2009). 
 
 Manage and measure. During this phase, management of resources and 
processes is the area of focus. It addresses the items involved in performance 
management and risk monitoring (Sherwood, Clark & Lynas 2009). 
 
5.4.8 Zachman Framework 
The Zachman Framework is a framework for enterprise architecture, which provides a 
formal and highly structured way of viewing and defining an enterprise (Alghamdi 2010). It is 
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based on a two-dimensional classification matrix: one dimension of the Zachman 
classification matrix is based on six interrogatives (What? How? Where? Who? When? and 
Why?), while the other dimension is based on six stakeholder groups (Visionary, Owner, 
Designer, Builder, Implementer and Worker) (Zachman 2011). The classification matrix is 
intended to provide a holistic view of the enterprise architecture being modelled (Alghamdi 
2010).  
5.4.9 Octave 
Octave is a methodology used for risk-based strategic assessment and planning for security 
(Alberts et al. 2003). Its main focus is on assets, threats and vulnerabilities (Vorster, 
Labuschagne 2005). In the Octave approach, the emphasis is on the use of internal people 
to lead the information security risk evaluation (Vorster, Labuschagne 2005, Alberts et al. 
2003)(Alberts et al. 2003)(Alberts et al. 2003). Octave is suitable for large organisations 
(Alberts et al. 2003).  
Octave is based on three aspects, namely, operational risk, security practices and 
technology (Alberts et al. 2003). These are complemented by a three-phased approach. 
These phases are the following (Alberts et al. 2003): 
 Phase 1. Build asset-based threat profiles. 
 Phase 2. Identify infrastructure vulnerabilities. 
 Phase 3. Develop security strategy and plans. 
 
5.4.10 Information Security Risk Analysis Method (ISRAM) 
ISRAM is a survey-based model that uses a quantitative approach to risk analysis which 
allows for the participation of managers and staff in the organisation (Vorster, Labuschagne 
2005). Quantitative tools included in ISRAM are simple numbers related to the survey, risk 
tables, as well as addition, multiplication and division operations (Karabacak, Sogukpinar 
2005). 
5.4.11 Cost of Risk Analysis (CORA) 
In terms of CORA methodology, risk parameters are expressed quantitatively and losses are 
expressed in quantitative monetary terms. This framework uses data collected on items such 
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as threats, functions and assets, and calculates the losses that result from the occurrence of 
threats (Vorster, Labuschagne 2005). 
5.4.12 Basel II 
The Basel II framework was developed with the intention to improve the safety and 
soundness of the financial system by placing more emphasis on banks’ own internal control 
and management, the supervisory review process and market discipline (Basel Committee 
2001). The Basel framework focuses on risk management at banks.  
The framework is structured into three main pillars (Basel Committee 2001): 
 First pillar: minimum capital requirement 
 Second pillar: supervisory review process 
 Third pillar: market discipline 
One of the components of the first pillar is the operational risk. Operational risk is defined 
as “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and 
systems or from external events” (Basel Committee 2001). Based on this definition, 
information technology and information security risks fall under operational risk (IT 
Governance Institute 2006).  
The Basel framework approach has been designed to encompass the complexity that is 
inherent in information technology (IT Governance Institute 2007b). Subsequently, the Basel 
II requirements have had a significant impact on the IT processes and infrastructure of 
financial institutions (Guldentops 2004). Examples of these would include business 
continuity, outsourcing, the adequacy of major IT investments, system obsolescence and the 
exposure of valuable and sensitive information (Guldentops 2004). 
5.4.13 COSO ERM 
An Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework was issued by the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organisations (COSO) of the Treadway Commission with a view to assisting 
organisations to assess and enhance their internal control systems (COSO 2004a). COSO 
provides the basis for planning, designing and implementing a risk management framework 
in organisations that addresses both financial and operational risks (IT Governance Institute 
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2007b). Such a framework focuses on four dimensions of an organisation’s objectives, 
namely, strategic, operations, reporting and compliance (COSO 2004a).  
These four dimensions are divided into eight interrelated components, namely, internal 
environment, objective setting, event identification, risk assessment, risk response, 
information and communication,  control activities and monitoring (COSO 2004a). 
The COSO framework appeals to various stakeholders with an interest in enterprise risk 
management, including the board of directors, senior management, auditors and regulators 
(COSO 2004a). 
5.2 Evaluation of existing frameworks 
 
In the preceding sections, existing frameworks were examined and their purpose, domains 
and target audience discussed. It should be noted that, in terms of information security, 
these frameworks all have strengths and weaknesses. This section looks at those strengths 
and weaknesses.  
 
The first framework to be evaluated is ISO/IEC 27002. The ISO/IEC 27002 is an exclusive 
information security framework. It is more detailed (and more technically oriented) than 
COBIT and therefore provides more guidance on how things should be done (Von Solms 
2005). Owing to its design, the ISO/IEC 27002 appeals more to information security 
professionals than to ICT security auditors and regulatory officials. ISO/IEC 27002 may also 
be viewed as ‘stand-alone’ guidelines that are not integrated into a wider framework for IT 
governance (Von Solms 2005). 
 
The Standard of Good Practice for Information Security designed by the Information 
Security Forum (ISF) has good generic information security principles that can be used by 
any organisation to implement an information security programme. Since its scope is broad 
enough to cover a wide range of information security aspects, it appeals to various 
stakeholders, thus making it a good standard. However, it also has some limitations since it 
is for the exclusive use of members of the ISF.  
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The PCI DSS is only applicable to financial institutions that store, transmit and process credit 
card information. Its scope is therefore limited to financial institutions that have credit card 
processing systems.  
 
While COBIT is a useful framework for identifying critical gaps, it has some deficiencies in 
that it offers minimal help in identifying the best practices that should be used to bridge 
those gaps (Fabian 2007). The reason behind this is that COBIT is a control and management 
framework rather than a process framework (IT Governance Institute 2008a). COBIT is also 
not an exclusive information security framework; it is an overall IT governance framework 
that encompasses many other things besides information security (Von Solms 2005). In 
terms of this study, the key advantage of COBIT is that it is acceptable to IT Security 
auditors, information security professionals and regulatory officials alike (IT Governance 
Institute 2007a). 
 
The ITIL is strong in IT processes, but limited in security and system development (Hoekstra, 
Conradie 2002). Unlike the COBIT and ISO 27002, it provides the how part of IT service 
management (IT Governance Institute 2008a).   
 
The PFIRES’s key strength is that, through four of its phases, it uses a life cycle in line with 
the standard information technology lifecycle (Rees, Bandyopadhyay & Spafford 2003). The 
downside of the model is the fact that it is relevant to strong security matters pertaining to 
e-commerce and security policy only. Its scope is therefore limited since information 
security is much broader than just these two areas.  
 
The SABSA framework is business-driven and business-focused. It is also scalable, that is, it 
can be introduced in subsequent areas and systems and implemented incrementally 
(Sherwood, Clark & Lynas 2009). SABSA fills the gap for security architecture and security 
service management by integrating seamlessly with other standards such as The Open Group 
Architecture Framework (TOGAF) and ITIL (Sherwood, Clark & Lynas 2009). However, it only 
appeals to information security professionals.  
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The advantages of the Zachman framework approach include an intuitive classification 
matrix which provides comprehensive coverage for all enterprise architecture stakeholders 
(Alghamdi 2010). The weaknesses of the approach include the generation of voluminous 
specification documentation which can be of questionable utility (Alghamdi 2010). 
OCTAVE, ISRAM, CORA, Basel and COSO are all focused on risk management, therefore 
they are rich tools for identifying risks, including those related to information security. 
 
OCTAVE is an effective information security risk evaluation that considers both 
organisational and technological issues (Alberts et al. 2003). Such an evaluation is vitally 
important to any security-improvement initiative because it generates an organisation-wide 
view of information security risks, providing a baseline for improvement (Alberts et al. 2003). 
The limiting factors of the OCTAVE risk analysis methodology include, among others, a great 
deal of investment in time, resources and formal training (Abdullah 2006).  
The key advantage of ISRAM is that it is easy to use and does not contain complicated 
mathematical and statistical instruments (Karabacak, Sogukpinar 2005). By contrast, CORA, 
because of the complexity and formality of its method, may require the participation of 
expert risk analysts (Karabacak, Sogukpinar 2005). CORA is also ideally suited for large 
organisations (SoftScout 2011). 
Basel II and COSO are general risk management frameworks, with Basel being tailored for 
banks in particular. Although neither Basel nor COSO specifically address information 
management and information technology, their principles have an impact on information 
and related technology (IT Governance Institute 2007b).  
 
The table below summarises the frameworks and standards that have been examined in the 
preceding section.
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Table 5.1 Comparison of different frameworks and standards 
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5.3 Conclusion 
 
This chapter examined a number of common frameworks and standards. It also identified 
the strengths and the weaknesses of the frameworks. It was noted that, when frameworks 
are developed, they have a particular focus. Accordingly, it is should be expected that a 
single framework or standard cannot cover all aspects of information security and IT in 
general. What organisations usually do is to use a combination of different frameworks and 
standards to help them achieve various information security objectives. 
 
While there are various frameworks that can be used by different role players to implement 
and evaluate information controls, there is no framework that seeks to bring the three role 
players together in implementing and evaluating information security controls. The 
frameworks discussed in this chapter would allow for use by each role player independently 
of other role players; however, this could lead to a ’silo’ effect, whereby the information 
security professionals and others parties involved (ICT security auditors and regulatory 
officials) would all be acting independently. This approach might be counterproductive since 
it does not ensure that there is alignment among the role players in relation to 
implementing and evaluating information security controls. For this reason, the role players 
should be aligned from the planning phases of information security up to the point where it 
is implemented and eventually evaluated. Consequently, there is a need to bring the role 
players together by using a framework that addresses the expectations and requirements of 
each role player. This will not only make the work of the role players easier, but it also has 
the potential to help organisations to implement sound information controls.  
 
The establishment of the new framework does not seek to reinvent the wheel by trying to 
explore areas that have already been addressed by the existing frameworks. The framework 
will instead build and expand on that work.  
 
The next chapter looks at the attributes of the various frameworks so that an understanding 
of what makes a good framework can be reached. These attributes will then form part of 
the new SAISA framework. 
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6.1 Introduction 
 
The focus of the previous chapter was on various existing frameworks and standards for 
information security locally (South Africa) and internationally. The weaknesses of these 
frameworks were identified; however, such weaknesses may be as a result of the fact that 
each framework has its own focus areas. Following the discussion in the previous chapter, 
the proposed information security framework seeks to build on and enhance the work that 
has already been done on existing frameworks. This will be achieved by taking advantage of 
the strengths of existing frameworks while seeking to improve on the weaknesses as far as 
the alignment of ICT security auditors, information security professionals and regulatory 
officials in the implementation and evaluation of information security controls is concerned.  
 
This chapter will highlight the components and attributes that make a good information 
security framework. This will be achieved by looking at critical components and attributes of 
the existing frameworks. These elements will then underpin the proposed framework, that 
is, they will be incorporated in the new framework.  
6.2 Attributes of the information security framework 
 
This section looks at the common characteristics of the various frameworks studied in 
chapter 5. These characteristics will be discussed under the following headings: the 
information security life cycle, critical elements of the framework, and the clarification of 
the roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders participating in a framework. These will 
now be discussed in detail. 
6.2.1 Information security life cycle 
 
In order to ensure that all aspects of information security are considered, it is essential that 
a framework follow an approach based on a comprehensive life cycle. The common life 
cycle approach adopted by most frameworks is one that is based on the plan–do–check–act 
(PDCA) cycle (Wright 2008, Eloff, Eloff 2005)(Wright 2008, Eloff, Eloff 2005), also commonly 
known as the Deming cycle (Vinh, Grewal 2005). It should be borne in mind that security is a 
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process and not a product; therefore, the life cycle approach should also be taken to 
managing security effectively, that is, organisations have to strive to constantly improve 
security (Vinh, Grewal 2005). 
This life cycle contributes to ensuring that there is continuous improvement in a process by 
looking at its critical phases. The four phases referred to in a PCDA model can be 
summarised as follows: 
 Plan – seeks to establish the strategies, objectives and programmes relevant to 
managing risk and improving information security, with a view to delivering results in 
accordance with an organisation’s overall strategic direction and objectives (Nonaka 
2009). 
 
 Do – implement and operate the information security policy, controls, processes and 
procedures (Nonaka 2009). 
 
 Check – assess and, where applicable, measure process performance against 
information security strategy and objectives and report the results to management 
for review (Nonaka 2009). This may involve the facilitation of audits to determine 
conformance to the statement of applicability and to identify opportunities for 
improvement (ISACA 2008b). 
 
 Act – take corrective and preventive actions, based on the results of audits, 
evaluation, compliance monitoring or management review, in order to achieve 
continual improvement of information security (Nonaka 2009). 
The PDCA model is illustrated in figure 6.1 below: 
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Figure 6.1 PDCA model (PDCA 2003) 
 
Most information security standards and frameworks adopt the principles of the PDCA 
model in one form or another. A number of examples to this effect are discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
ISO/IEC 27001 is based on the PDCA approach (see figure 6.2) to modelling all information 
security management systems (ISMS) (ISO/IEC 27001 2005). The standard has the following 
phases that are in line with PDCA principles (ISO/IEC 27001 2005): 
 Establish ISMS (plan). 
 Implement and operate the ISMS (do). 
 Monitor and review the ISMS (check). 
 Maintain and improve the ISMS (act). 
 What Makes A Good Information Security Framework  
Chapter 6   111 
 
Figure 6.2 PDCA model applied to ISMS processes (ISO/IEC 27001 2005) 
 
COBIT also has a structure similar to the PDCA model. The four COBIT domains (briefly 
discussed in chapter 5) demonstrate COBIT’s resemblance in structure to that of the PDCA 
model (IT Governance Institute 2007a):   
 Plan and organise – This domain focuses on strategy and tactics, and suggests ways 
in which IT can best contribute to the achievement of the business objectives. To 
realise strategic vision, it needs to be planned, communicated and managed 
according to different perspectives (ISACA 2008b, IT Governance Institute 2007a).  
 
 Acquire and implement – To deliver on the IT strategy, IT solutions need to be 
identified, developed or acquired, as well as implemented and integrated into the 
business environment. In addition, changes in and maintenance to existing systems 
are covered by this domain to make sure that the life cycle is continued for these 
systems (ISACA 2008b, IT Governance Institute 2007a). 
  
 Deliver and support – In this domain, the actual delivery of required services is 
addressed. These services range from traditional operations for security and 
continuity aspects to training. The delivery of services requires that the necessary 
support processes be put in place (ISACA 2008b, IT Governance Institute 2007a).  
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 Monitor and evaluate – All IT processes need to be assessed regularly over time for 
their quality and their compliance with control requirements. Thus, this domain 
addresses management's monitoring and evaluation of IT performance and 
increased control, ensuring regulatory compliance and providing IT governance 
oversight (ISACA 2008b, IT Governance Institute 2007a).  
The ISO/IEC 27001 standard and COBIT are not the only frameworks/standards that have 
adopted the PDCA model. Other frameworks have followed suit and their structures also 
reflect PDCA principles. These include the approach that underpins the Sherwood Applied 
Business Security Architecture (SABSA), the Policy Framework for Interpreting Risk in E-
Business Security (PFIRES) and ITIL.  
The SABSA life cycle, shown in figure 6.3 below, is designed to align with the IT life cycle 
(SABSA 2011). In SABSA’s life cycle, the first two phases of the SABSA development process 
are grouped in an activity called 'strategy and concept’ (ISACA 2008a, Sherwood, Clark & 
Lynas 2009). This is followed by an activity called ‘design,’ which embraces the design of the 
logical, physical, component and operational architectures (ISACA 2008a, Sherwood, Clark & 
Lynas 2009). The third activity is ‘implement’ followed by ‘manage and measure’. The 
significance of the ‘measure’ activity is that, early in the process, target performance metrics 
are developed as shown in the attributes section below (ISACA 2008a). Once the system is 
operational, it is essential to measure actual performance against targets, and to manage 
any deviations observed. Such management may simply involve the manipulation of 
operational parameters, but it may also feed back into a new cycle of development (ISACA 
2008a). 
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Figure 6.3 SABSA framework life cycle 
 
The PFIRES life cycle consists of four major phases: assess, plan, deliver, and operate. Each is 
sharply defined with specific exit criteria that should be met before transitioning to the next 
phase (Rees, Bandyopadhyay & Spafford 2003). 
ITIL’s life cycle, which closely resembles the PDCA model, is as follows: requirements, design, 
build, deploy, operate and optimise (Rudd 2004). This is an end-to-end life cycle, which has 
clear stages that must be followed as the organisation embarks on implementing the ITIL. 
The above discussion on the various frameworks and standards sought to indicate that they 
(frameworks and standards) have a common principle in their structure, that is, a life cycle. 
A life cycle ensures that there is a structure that is being adhered to by the framework, 
which ultimately facilitates the fulfilment of user requirements. For instance, the ISO/IEC 
27001 standard adopts the PDCA lifecycle in order to take the information security 
requirements and expectations of the interested parties as input (ISO/IEC 27001 2005). By 
applying the required actions and processes, it produces information security outcomes that 
meet those requirements and expectations (ISO/IEC 27001 2005). 
Critically, the life cycle allows for various role players to be involved in different stages of 
the framework. It could allow for the involvement of information security professionals, ICT 
security auditors and regulatory officials in the implementation and evaluation of 
information security controls in an organisation at various stages. For example, ICT security 
auditors can be involved in the planning and design stages of an information security 
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programme. If they have concerns they want to raise or contributions to make, they would 
do so there and then, before the information security professionals go ahead with 
implementing the security controls. This involvement could also help the auditors to adjust 
their audit programmes accordingly; moreover, it would help information security 
professionals to understand the expectations of the auditors. It is therefore clear that for a 
framework to be effective it must follow a proper approach based on a life cycle. 
6.2.2 Critical elements of an information security framework 
 
A framework must integrate certain elements to enable it to be more effective when it is 
applied in a real-world situation. The elements of the framework make it rich in detail and 
more meaningful to its users. Attributes such as inputs and outputs, measures and metrics 
have been found to prevail in most of the frameworks studied in chapter 5. In the same 
vein, certain questions (What? Why? How? and Who?) must be answered during the 
formulation of the framework (Sherwood, Clark & Lynas 2009, Zachman 2011). Answering 
these questions assists in the development of a comprehensive framework. 
The elements and attributes of the critical elements of a framework will now be discussed: 
 Inputs and outputs. Every process in a framework must have some sort of input and 
output (IT Governance Institute 2008b). Inputs are items that the process requires 
before it can be activated, while outputs refer to the outcomes and deliverables of 
the process. The output of one process can be an input to another process, 
especially in life cycle based processes. The COBIT framework uses inputs and 
outputs in all its processes. 
 
 Measures and metrics. It is very important to have a means of measuring a particular 
activity, as this makes it easier to manage. The organisation’s information security 
processes must be documented, measured and managed in order for them to be 
effective (The Open Group 2011). Measures and metrics are fundamental in 
providing decision support (ISACA 2008b), while KGIs and KPIs can be useful in 
determining whether a process has achieved its goal (ISACA 2008b). 
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 Dependencies. In order for a certain process to execute properly, certain conditions 
have to be satisfied. These conditions may not necessarily be in the control of the 
owner of the process. 
 
 What? This, in the main, refers to the assets that need to be protected. It also refers 
to the business’s needs for information security, for example security as a strategic 
business component, operational continuity or compliance with laws (Sherwood, 
Clark & Lynas 2009). 
 
 Why? The reasons and motivation behind putting a particular control for information 
security in place. Answering the “Why” helps to indicate how important the control 
is in relation to the business objectives.  
 
 How? This section describes how the protection will be achieved, in terms of high-
level technical and management security strategies, as well as the tools to be used to 
meet the information security objectives from a business point of view (Sherwood, 
Clark & Lynas 2009)(Sherwood, Clark & Lynas 2009). 
 
 Who? Specifying the entities (e.g. users, information security officers, compliance 
officers and auditors) and their interrelationships, attributes and authorised roles 
(Sherwood, Clark & Lynas 2009). 
 
The above are not the only elements that are crucial in a framework. There are others that 
are equally important e.g. responsible, accountable, consulted, and informed. These are 
discussed in the following section. 
6.3 RACI Model 
 
The RACI (Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, and Informed) Model is a tool used for 
identifying and clarifying the roles and responsibilities in a process (RACI Model 2011). It is a 
two-dimensional matrix which shows the ‘level involvement’ of functional roles in a set of 
activities (Continental Solutions 2011). It is a powerful tool and can be used to determine 
the fundamental issues with a process where the wrong people are involved and/or no one 
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is accountable (Banacorsi 2011). The benefits of using the RACI Model are the following 
(Banacorsi 2011): 
 
 Encourages teamwork by clarifying roles and responsibilities 
 Eliminates duplication of effort 
 Reduces misunderstanding 
 Improves communication – makes sure people are not left out 
 Determines ownership 
 Helps clarify activities and tasks in a process 
 Reduces bad decisions by ensuring the correct people are involved 
 Clarifies hands-offs and boundaries  
 Improves cross-functional view for all employees 
 
RACI stands for Responsible, Accountable, Consulted and Informed: 
 
 R = Responsible  
 
The responsible person is the owner of the problem, activity or process (RACI Model 2011). 
The responsible individual performs an activity (the doer).  The degree of responsibility is 
defined by the accountable person. Responsibility can be shared or delegated (Banacorsi 
2011). 
 
 A = Accountable 
 
Accountable is the person to whom ‘R’ is accountable. They must sign off (approve) on the 
task before it is effective (RACI Model 2011). There can only be one accountable in a process 
and it cannot be delegated (Banacorsi 2011). 
 
 C = Consulted 
 
The consulted has the information and/or capacity necessary to complete the activity (RACI 
Model 2011). They are consulted before a final decision or action is taken (Banacorsi 2011). 
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 I = Informed 
 
These are the individuals that must be notified after the action has been taken or, finally, of 
the results, but they need not be necessarily consulted (RACI Model 2011, Banacorsi 2011). 
 
Based on the above, the RACI model can play a crucial role in ensuring that the roles and 
responsibilities of the information security professionals, ICT security auditors and 
regulatory officials are clarified and duplication of effort minimised or eliminated. Since the 
study is about these three role players, understanding and clarifying their roles and 
responsibilities is a key deliverable of this study. The RACI model helps in clarifying the roles 
and responsibilities of the role players in order to reflect the principle that the information 
security professionals have an operational role, while the ICT security auditors and 
regulatory officials, in contrast, have control responsibilities but not operational 
responsibilities (IT Governance Institute 2007a). Understanding the roles and responsibilities 
for each process is crucial for effective governance (IT Governance Institute 2007a). 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
It is clear that common attributes are found in the various frameworks. The life cycle was 
identified as one of the key structures that a framework should contain. The life cycle is 
important because it puts the structure in place that allows the framework to contain a 
number of phases that, when put together, form a complete cycle. Furthermore, it allows 
the framework to be organised into logical phases, starting with the planning phase and 
progressing to the phases that involve the implementation and measurement of 
programmes. The PDCA model was identified as the foundation of the life cycles adopted by 
many of the frameworks studied. 
 
This chapter also discussed the critical elements that must be incorporated in a framework. 
These included items such inputs, outputs, measurements and metrics. Each phase in a life 
cycle must address the elements of the framework; this helps to divide the phases into 
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smaller building blocks that are easy to work with. Elements common to many frameworks 
were briefly defined and discussed.  
 
The RACI model, which is used to identify and clarify roles and responsibilities, was 
discussed. The discussion focused on how the RACI model can assist in ensuring that the 
role players understand what is expected of them within a framework. 
 
The following chapter will present the proposed framework. In line with the characteristics 
of the frameworks studied, the new framework will comprise the four phases that have 
been identified as making up a life cycle. Each phase will consist of elements that are in line 
with the practices adopted by the various frameworks. The roles and responsibilities of the 
role players in each phase will be clarified by applying the RACI model. 
  
    
Chapter 7  
The SAISA Framework 
 
 The SAISA framework    
Chapter 7   120 
 
Chapter 2: 
Status of Information 





Role Players In The Implementation 
And Evaluation Of Information 
Security 
Chapter 4: 
Challenges in the Implementation And 
Evaluation of Information Security 
Requirements 
FRAMEWORK LITERATURE REVIEW 
Chapter 5: 




The SAlSA Framework 
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
Chapter 6: 
What Makes A Good Information 
Security Framework? 
 The SAISA framework    
Chapter 7   121 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapters, the focus was on literature concerning the general information 
security position in South Africa and abroad. The initiatives and solutions that currently exist 
in this regard were identified and discussed. In addition, the current challenges (such as lack 
of skills, financial resources constraints) faced by those with an interest in information 
security were highlighted. It was also acknowledged that information security requires 
support and commitment, as well as the involvement of many role players in an 
organisation. However, for the purposes of the study, the focus is on the involvement of the 
three key role players in the sphere of information security. These are information security 
professionals, ICT security auditors and regulatory officials. 
The three role players were identified as the critical stakeholders in the implementation and 
evaluation of information security. The preceding discussion has highlighted the fact that, 
although the three role players have their own distinct roles, their work is closely linked and 
therefore a great deal of integration and alignment is required. However, as was also 
mentioned, there is no framework that provides specific guidance on the way in which the 
three role players can be aligned in the implementation and evaluation of information 
security controls. 
The identification of this misalignment problem led to a new approach being proposed to 
address this problem. The proposed approach takes the form of an information security 
framework, which will ensure alignment among information security professionals, ICT 
security auditors and regulatory officials. Although there is currently no specific framework 
that seeks to ensure alignment among the three role players, it should be noted that there 
are existing frameworks that in some way or another address this challenge, albeit on a 
limited scale (not comprehensively). To this end, the current information security 
frameworks had to be looked at with a view to identifying their strengths, weaknesses and 
general characteristics.  
This chapter presents a new framework which is intended to ensure the alignment of 
information security professionals, ICT security auditors and regulatory officials in the 
implementation and evaluation of information security controls in organisations. 
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7.2 The South African Information Security Alignment 
(SAISA) framework 
 
The main objective of this framework is to ensure alignment among information security 
professionals, ICT security auditors and regulatory officials in the implementation and 
evaluation of information security by South African organisations. The framework seeks to 
achieve this by involving all these role players in all stages of the information security 
programme, that is, from the planning phase, through its execution to, eventually, the 
evaluation of the information security controls.  
This approach, which involves the role players in all stages of the information security 
programme, ensures that any gaps are highlighted as close as possible to the point where 
they occur. It is cheaper to correct gaps at this stage than to deal with them at a later stage, 
when it could even be too late.  
The SAISA framework seeks to assist the three role players in the following ways:  
 By ensuring that information security professionals are able to understand what is 
expected of them during the planning phases of information security programmes. 
This has a potential to produce fewer surprises at the end when the ICT security 
auditors and regulatory officials evaluate the controls and issue reports.  
 
 By enabling ICT security auditors to understand the organisation’s risk profile, as well 
as its capacity and capabilities. This will help them formulate their audit programmes 
in line with the information they obtain from the planning stages of the information 
security programme.  
 
 By giving regulatory officials an opportunity to make information security 
professionals aware of what is expected of them with regard to regulatory 
compliance during the planning, implementation and delivery phases. This has the 
potential to improve compliance with regulatory requirements. 
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 By ensuring that the three role players engage with each other in all the phases of 
the programme. This approach helps all concerned to know what the other parties 
are doing and where necessary align appropriately. For example, if, during a risk 
assessment, information security professionals identify information leakages as the 
highest risk, then ICT security auditors can align the audit programme so that it 
focuses on the evaluation of controls related to information leakage. Furthermore, if 
regulatory officials have more concerns about privacy issues, the information 
security professionals can make privacy one of the key items to be addressed in an 
information security programme. In addition, the ICT security auditors would have to 
ensure that their audit programme address the evaluation of controls related to 
privacy matters. 
It should be emphasised that ICT security auditors and regulatory officials must remain 
independent and this framework does not seek to change this. Although the planning, 
implementation and delivery of information security programmes are the primary 
responsibilities of information security professionals, during these stages, the ICT security 
auditors and regulatory officials play an advisory/support role and are able to collect 
information which also improves the quality of their own work. The ICT security auditors 
and regulatory officials are primarily responsible for monitoring and evaluating the 
information security controls, which is usually the last phase of the information security 
programme.  
7.2.1 Structure of the SAISA Framework 
 
Chapter 6 highlighted the fact that it is crucial for a framework to a follow a structured life 
cycle in the form of a PDCA model. Accordingly, the proposed framework will not deviate 
from this common practice, but will adopt the four COBIT framework domains. The COBIT 
framework is referred to as the overall IT governance framework. Through IT governance, 
information security forms part of corporate governance. Accordingly, COBIT is a framework 
that can be used by organisations to implement IT governance effectively in their 
environments.  
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This study does not seek to reinvent the wheel when it comes to the existing frameworks. 
Hence, it is essential to base the new information security framework on the existing 
framework(s) so as to capitalise on their strengths while seeking to establish a framework 
that aligns the role players in the implementation and evaluation of information security 
controls. A decision was therefore taken to base the new framework (structurally) on COBIT 
because of its IT governance coverage (information security is part of IT governance), its 
lifecycle approach and the fact that it appeals to all the three role players.  
While COBIT is a high-level IT governance framework, it is not a framework that explicitly 
ensures the alignment of information security professionals, ICT security auditors and 
regulatory officials in terms of information security implementation and evaluation. The 
reason for this is, partly, that COBIT is not exclusive to information security – it addresses 
information technology governance and refers, among many other issues, to information 
security (Von Solms 2005). 
As indicated in chapters 5 and 6, COBIT has four domains, namely: Plan and Organise (PO), 
Acquire and Implement (AI), Deliver and Support (DS), and Monitor and Evaluate (ME). The 
SAISA framework adopts these four domains from a structural point of view. As such, the 
new framework will have four phases that resemble the four COBIT 4.1 domains.  
The SAISA framework, subsequently, has the following phases:  
 Plan and organise information security (PO-IS) 
 Acquire and implement information security AI-IS) 
 Deliver and support information security (DS-IS) 
 Monitor and evaluate information security (ME-IS) 
The four phases of the framework seek to ensure the effective implementation and 
evaluation of information security. Each phase provides information on what is expected 
from each role player and what tools and approaches they can use to execute their tasks.  
The framework is illustrated in figure 7.1 below. 
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Figure 7.1 SAISA framework life cycle 
 
7.2.2 Elements of the SAISA framework 
 
Each phase of the SAISA framework has multiple key elements. These elements help to 
clarify what is expected from each role player in each phase of the framework. The elements 
have been adapted from those identified in chapter 6. In that chapter, the following were 
identified as being critical in a framework: What, Why, How, Who, Inputs and Outputs, 
Measures and Metrics, Dependencies and Level of involvement. 
Based on these elements, the following have been identified as key elements of the new 
framework: 
 Role  
 Objective  
 Approach  
 Tools 
 Level of involvement 
 Dependencies 
 Inputs 
 Deliverables  
 The SAISA framework    
Chapter 7   126 
 Measurements  
These elements are discussed in detail below. The items in parenthesis indicate the 
relationship between the element and the ones identified in chapter 6. 
Role (What & Who?) 
The role for each role player in each phase is defined in this section. This is to ensure that 
each role player understands what is expected of them in the particular phase. It also helps 
each role player to understand the roles of the other role players in each phase.   
Objective (Why?)  
In the objective section, the reason behind each role player’s involvement in each phase is 
defined. It is important for each role player to understand why the other role players are 
involved in each phase, as this can improve cooperation among the role players.  
Approach (How?) 
To achieve the objectives, certain approaches are necessary. A recommended approach is 
spelt out here. This approach provides the ’how’ or the way in which each role player 
achieves their goals.    
Tools (How?) 
These are the minimum tools required for each role player to succeed in achieving their 
objectives and performing according to the role definition. These tools could be anything 
from automated systems to documented processes, standards and guidelines 
Level of involvement (RACI Model) 
This section seeks to define the level of involvement that is expected from each role player 
in each phase. There are two levels of involvement: primary involvement and secondary 
involvement. If the role player has a primary involvement in the phase, it means this phase 
forms the core of the role player’s responsibility.  
If the involvement of the role player is secondary, it means that the role player is playing an 
advisory/support role to ensure that the other role players are able to achieve their 
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objectives successfully. This involvement is still critical, however, because without their 
advice/support the other role players may not necessarily succeed. 
A RACI model is used to define the roles in the form of Responsible, Accountable, Consulted 
and Informed. 
Dependencies (Dependencies) 
These requirements are not necessarily under the control of the role player, but are critical 
factors in ensuring that the role player is able to deliver on what is expected of them in the 
particular domain. 
Inputs (Inputs) 
These may be documents and any other information which are of use to the role player in 
understanding the environment so that they can formulate their plans and strategies better. 
This can also be information that the role player needs in order to make the appropriate 
choices and opinions regarding the controls. Inputs can either be internal (to the 
organisation) or external (e.g. regulatory requirements). 
Deliverables (Outputs) 
This is a list of deliverables, which is expected from the role player in each phase. 
Accordingly, the deliverables in one phase may be an input in the next domain. However, 
they could also be used by other role players in executing their activities. 
Measurements (Measures and Metrics) 
These are the measurement criteria of the deliverables expected from the role players in 
each phase. 
7.2.3 RACI chart for the framework 
 
A RACI model is used to determine the level of involvement for the role players. As already 
mentioned, RACI stands for: R = Responsible, A = Accountable, C = Consulted and I = 
Informed. In this study, RACI has been adopted for the framework to ensure that the roles 
and responsibilities of the role players are properly clarified. This is illustrated in table 7.1. 
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Table 7.1 RACI model For SAISA framework  










Phases     
Phase 1: 
Plan and organise information security 
A/R C C Information security professionals are 
accountable and responsible for the planning 
of information security. Auditors and 
regulatory officials are consulted. 
Phase 2:  
Acquire and implement information security 
A/R C I Information security professionals are 
accountable and responsible for the 
implementation of information security. 
Auditors are consulted while regulatory 
officials are informed. 
Phase 3: 
Deliver and support information security 
A/R C I Information security professionals are 
accountable and responsible for supporting 
information security (e.g. configuring 
firewalls). Auditors are consulted while 
regulatory officials are informed. 
Phase 4: 
Monitor and evaluate information security 
A R C Information security professionals are 
accountable for addressing the findings of the 
auditors (who are responsible for evaluating 
the controls). Regulatory officials have to be 
consulted in order to ascertain that the 
compliance requirements are met by the 
organisation. 
 
The detailed framework, complete with all the details, is presented in the next section: 
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7.2.4 The SAISA Framework 
 
PHASE 1 PLAN AND ORGANISE Information Security 
ROLE PLAYERS Information security professionals ICT security auditors Regulatory officials 
ELEMENTS    
Objective  To ensure that the security programme 
is driven from a strategic point of view. 
 To ensure that gaps in strategy are identified 
and highlighted at the very beginning before 
programme is implemented. 
 Assist information security professionals to 
incorporate key regulatory requirements in 
to the strategy.  
Role  Develop information security strategy. 
 Review information security strategy on 
an annual basis. 
 Develop information security 
programme. 
 Understand the information security 
strategy.  
 Ascertain that the strategy is in line with 
corporate strategy. 
 Highlight regulatory requirements that 
must be met by the organisation so that 
they can be incorporated into the strategy. 
RACI Chart  Accountable/responsible  Consulted  Consulted 
Approach  Perform risk assessments. 
 Understand the business strategy and 
translate it into information security 
deliverables. 
 Look at the previous ICT audit reports. 
 Prioritise deliverables based on the 
business requirements. 
 Understand the internal control model of the 
organisation. 
 Read and assess the information security 
strategy. 
 
 Provide a list of compliance requirements 
that are applicable to the organisation 
concerned. 
 Educate information security professionals 
on what is expected of them to ensure 
compliance. 
 Hold workshops, seminars and telephonic 
advice centres where regulatory 
requirements are discussed. 
Table 7.2 The SAISA Framework 
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 ISACA Standards and Guidelines 
 Institute of Internal Auditors Standards 
 General Accepted Auditing Standards 
 ECT Act 
 Comsec Act 
 Electronic Communications and 
Transactions (ECT) Act 
 Protection of Personal Information (PPI) 
 Regulation of Interception of 
Communication Act (RICA)  
 Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA) 
Level of involvement  This is the information security 
professionals’ primary area. They need 
to develop and own the strategy. 
 ICT security auditors play a supportive role in 
helping to ensure that the information 
security strategy has as few gaps as possible. 
 Regulatory officials help to ensure that the 
strategy does not omit the key compliance 
issues. They play a supportive role. 
Dependencies  Senior management involvement  Timely availability of information from those 
developing the strategy 
 Willingness of the information security 
professionals to accept advice and 
incorporate it into the strategy 
Inputs  Corporate strategy 
 Enterprise risk framework. 
 ECT Act 
 Comsec Act 
 Electronic Communications and 
Transactions (ECT) Act 
 Protection of Personal Information (PPI) 
 Regulation of Interception of 
Communication Act (RICA)  
 Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA) 
 KING III  
 ICT security auditors findings and 
recommendations 
 Best practices 
 Threats analysis 
 Corporate strategy 
 Information security strategy 
 Previous audit reports 
 
 COMSEC 
 Cyber inspectors 
National Cyber Security Advisory Council 
 National Computer Security Incident 
Response Teams 
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Deliverables  Information security strategy. 
 Information security implementation 
roadmap. 
 Information Security Policies. 
 Information security architecture. 
 Risk Registers. 
 Organisation’s risk profile 
 Audit programme 
 
 List of laws  applicable to the organisation 
 List of compliance requirements  
Measurements  Completeness of the strategy 
 Alignment of the strategy with the 
corporate strategy 
 Audit programme based on the information 
security strategy and the organisation’s risk 
profile 
 Level of compliance of the strategy to the 
regulatory requirements 
PHASE 2 ACQUIRE AND IMPLEMENT Information Security 
ROLE PLAYERS Information security professionals ICT security auditors Regulatory officials 
ELEMENTS    
Objective  Identification and implementation of 
appropriate systems in line with 
information security strategy must be 
performed by information security 
professionals. 
 Having independent assurance in the project 
ensures deviations are strictly controlled and 
reported to the appropriate structures (e.g. 
project boards). 
 The regulatory officials are appraised on 
the solutions obtained to ensure 
compliance with regulatory requirements. 
Role 
 
 Identify, acquire and implement the 
information security technologies. 
 
 Provide assurance on information security 
projects. 
 
 Advise on the suitability of the identified 
solutions for meeting the compliance 
requirements. 
RACI Chart  Accountable/Responsible  Consulted  Informed 
Approach  Employ the project management 
methodology to ensure that technology 
implementation subscribes to best 
practices. 
 Review the solutions being implemented, 
identify and highlight any gaps. 
 Verify that the project subscribes to best 
practices. 
 Verify that the project undertaking is in line 
 Compare the solution capabilities to the 
identified compliance requirements. 
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with the information security strategy. 
Tools  System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) 
processes. 
 Project management tools 
 Project management processes (e.g. 
PMBOK or PRINCE 2). 
 Business cases 
 SDLC processes 
 Source code 
 Computer Aided Audit Engineering Tools 
(CAAT’s) 
 Business cases. 
 Project reports 
 Business cases 
 Project reports 
Level of involvement  Information security professionals are 
the primary owners of this process. They 
must identify, acquire and implement 
appropriate solutions in line with the 
strategy. 
 The ICT security auditors must provide 
quality assurance to ensure that elements 
that may have adverse effects on the project 
are highlighted and reported on 
appropriately. 
 Regulatory officials provide the advisory 
services only to information security 
professionals to ensure that the new 
technologies being implemented meet the 
compliance requirements. 
Dependencies  Funding availability 
 Resources availability 
 Project sponsor support 
 Corporation from the project resources 
 Timely availability of the information 
 Corporation from the project resources 
 Timely availability of the required 
information 
Inputs  Information security strategy 
 Information security architecture 
 Risk register 
 Project plans 
 Progress reports 
 
 Business cases 
 Technical assessment of the solution 
Deliverables  Information security standards 
 Project scope 
 Project report 
 Project risk registers 
 Auditors’ project reports 
 
 Reports on how the technology will meet 
the compliance issues. 
 Reports on any possible gaps that the 
solution might have in relation to the 
compliance requirements. 
Measurements  Failure/success rates of the information 
security projects. 
 
 Findings/gaps identified during project  Completeness of the reports identifying 
the gaps between capabilities of the 
solution and the compliance requirements 
  
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PHASE 3 DELIVER AND SUPPORT Information Security 
ROLE PLAYERS Information security professionals ICT security auditors Regulatory officials 
ELEMENTS    
Objective  Information security professionals must 
ensure that the deployed solutions run 
smoothly and are continuously 
maintained to stay abreast of the new 
requirements. 
 ICT security auditors must provide 
independent assurance as to whether the 
changes to the production environment are 
introduced through a formal process (e.g. 
change management process). 
 
 
 The regulatory officials must satisfy 
themselves that the deployed systems and 
processes ensure the organisation’s 
compliance with regulatory requirements. 
Role 
 
 Ensure that information security 
systems run in accordance with 
information security requirements. 
 Maintain the systems and the 
configurations. 
 Maintain the appropriate 
documentation. 
 Verify that the change management 
processes are being adhered to. 
 Identify any deviations from the strategy. 
 
 Ascertain that the delivered solutions 
ensure compliance with the provisions of 
the regulatory requirements. 
 
RACI Chart  Accountable/Responsible  Consulted  Informed 
Approach  Perform self-assessments 
 Produce and react to performance 
reports of the systems. 
 Continuous auditing  Review the reports from the information 
security professionals on what is being 
done to ensure the systems’ continuing 
complying with the regulatory 
requirements. 
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Tools   Identity management 




 Physical security 
 Vulnerability assessment tools 
 Background checks 
 Continuous auditing tools 
 Vulnerability assessment tools 
 
 Reports 
 Compliance checklists 
Level of involvement  This is the information security 
professionals’ primary are;, they are 
expected to deploy, support and 
maintain the systems and processes to 
stay abreast of new trends and 
developments inside and outside the 
organisation. 
 The ICT security auditors must provide 
continuous assurance to ensure that the 
systems and processes continue operating 
efficiently and effectively. 
 The regulators play a silent role, and are 
dependent on information security 
professionals and ICT security auditors for 
reports to determine systems’ level of 
compliance. They may, however, conduct 
spot checks to ascertain that what is 
reported is in line with what is happening 
on the ground. 
Dependencies  Appropriately developed solutions to 
ensure reliability 
 Appropriate access to the systems to allow 
for the running of the audit tools 
 Completeness of the provided information 
by information security professionals and 
ICT security auditors 
Inputs  Information security standards 
 
 Reports from auditing tools 
 Reports from vulnerability assessments 
 Information security standards, procedures, 
guidelines and processes 
 Auditors reports 
 Information security professionals reports 
 Requested evidence 
Deliverables  Reports (e.g. incident reports) 
 Trend analysis reports 
 Information security procedures, 
guidelines and processes 
 Operational manuals 
 
 Preliminary findings 
 Reports on the assessment and effectiveness 
of controls 
 Preliminary compliance reports 
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Measurements  Resilience and robustness of the 
systems 
 Intrusion detection/prevention 
capabilities 
 Level of security awareness within the 
organisation 
 Quality of the preliminary findings 
 Early detection of deviations 
 Capability to identify and enforce 
compliance issues before they deteriorate 
further 
 Level of compliance with the regulatory 
requirements of the organisation 
PHASE 4 MONITOR AND EVALUATE Information Security 
ROLE PLAYERS Information security professionals ICT security auditors Regulatory officials 
ELEMENTS    
Objective  While independent reviews are 
performed by ICT security auditors, 
information security professionals must 
perform their own assessment in order 
to proactively rectify any deviations. 
 
 
 This is the ICT security auditors’ primary area 
and the reports they produce are used by 
senior management, the board, 
shareholders and other stakeholders in 
order to provide an understanding of the 
level of information security controls in an 
organisation. 
 
 Regulatory officials need to determine 
whether the information security controls 
implemented in an organisation are in line 
with regulatory requirements. The officials 
produce reports detailing the level of 
compliance of the organisation. They also 
recommend punitive measures that the 
organisation must face when regulatory 
requirements are violated. 
Role 
 
 Monitor the implemented controls 
against the information strategy. 
 Evaluate the information security 
strategy against the business strategy to 
ensure alignment and relevance. 
 Provide an independent review of the 
implemented controls against the 
information security and corporate 
strategies. 
 Provide the recommendations on corrective 
action to be taken by management.  
 Perform follow-up audits 
 Assess the state of compliance of the 
information security controls against the 
regulatory requirements. 
 Assess the seriousness of violation, if any. 
 Provide advice on the correct action to 
take. 
 Advise on the punitive measures to be 
taken against the organisation in case of 
violations. 
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RACI Chart  Accountable  Responsible  Consulted 
Approach  Perform proactive self-assessments on 
an ongoing basis with a view to taking 
corrective action where necessary.  
 Request and review the evidence in order to 
ascertain whether the information security 
controls in an organisation are effective and 
efficient.  
 Interview the information security 
professionals to gain more insight into the 
way controls are implemented and identify 
any gaps. 
 Compare reports and evidence from 
information security professionals against 
the compliance requirements. 
Tools  Logs 
 Incident reports 
 
 Computer-Assisted Audit Techniques 
(CAATs) 
 Evidence 
 Working papers 
 Compliance checklists 
 Auditors’ reports 
 The reports received from information 
security professionals 
 
Level of involvement  Information security professionals play a 
mainly supportive role in this domain by 
providing the reports and evidence 
requested by the ICT security auditors 
and regulatory officials. 
 As this is their core area, ICT security 
auditors must go through the evidence 
before them and state opinions on the 
adequacy of the information security 
controls. The auditors are therefore involved 
from start to finish in this phase.  
 Regulatory officials can use the auditors’ 
reports to gain a general understand of the 
information security controls in an 
organisation, especially in relation to 
compliance matters. If the auditors’ 
reports highlight the possibility of serious 
breaches of regulatory requirements, the 
regulators may perform their assessments 
to determine if indeed there are any 
serious compliance issues. 
Dependencies  Facility to keep logs. 
 
 Accessibility and readability of the logs 
 Timely availability of the required evidence 
 Completeness of the information provided 
by the information security professionals. 
Inputs  Audit logs (e.g. user activity) 
 Reports e.g. from firewalls and antivirus 
 General standards.  Auditors’ reports. 
 The reports received from information 
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servers 
 
 Standards of field work 
 Standards of reporting 
 
security professionals 
 Regulatory universe 
 Previous reported issues 
Deliverables  Management comments (from the 
audits) 






 Audit reports 
 
 Final reports 
 List of transgressions 
 Recommendations 
 Punitive measures 
 
Measurements   Number of new findings 
 Number of repeat findings 
 Quality of the findings 
 Performance of the field work on time and 
on budget 
 Enforcement of the compliance 
requirements 
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7.3 Conclusion 
 
The above framework seeks to improve alignment among the three role players. It does not 
replace existing frameworks such as ISO 27002 and COBIT. In fact, it incorporates the 
existing frameworks and standards by recommending that they be used as tools for the 
planning and implementation of information security controls.  
It should be noted that this framework is broad in nature. As such, certain elements may be 
adjusted depending on where it is applied. For instance, a financial institution may adjust it 
to fit the financial environment by removing the regulations and laws not applicable to 
financial institutions (e.g. RICA). Similarly, telecommunications organisations can remove 
the regulations and laws that are not applicable to the telecommunications industry (e.g. 
FICA and PCI DSS) from the framework. In essence, the framework provides a high-level 
guideline for ensuring the alignment of information security professionals, ICT security 
auditors and regulatory officials, as information security controls are implemented and 
evaluated.  Using these guidelines, the framework can be easily adapted to various 
scenarios.  
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8.1 Introduction 
 
The South African Information Security Alignment (SAISA) framework was presented in the 
previous chapter. This chapter revisits the objectives of this study, as outlined in chapter 1, 
in order to determine how they were met as the framework was established. The chapter 
also focuses on the research questions that underpin this study in order to ascertain how 
they were answered. Further, the strengths and the weaknesses of the framework are 
discussed and future work in this field is recommended. 
8.2 Research objectives 
 
The objectives of the research were to (a) identify the common areas among the role 
players; (b) identify the methodologies and tools of each role player, which they use to carry 
out their responsibilities; (c) bridge the gaps between the role players; (d) address the 
misalignment problem among the role players; and (e) establish a groundwork for a 
framework.  
By means of a literature review, common areas among the role players were identified 
especially with regard to the fact that they all have one common goal: to ensure that the 
organisation’s assets and the interests of various stakeholders (e.g. customers and 
shareholders) are properly protected. Standards and frameworks were also identified as 
areas of overlap among the role players. For instance, COBIT can be used by information 
security professionals to implement controls, while it can also be used by ICT security 
auditors to identify and evaluate controls. Regulatory officials can also use it to verify the 
compliance status of the organisation. 
The tools and methodologies that are used by each role player were identified and 
discussed in chapter 3. These included audit standards and Computer Assisted Audit Tools 
(CAATS) for auditors, information security standards (e.g. ISO/IEC 27002) for information 
security professionals, and laws and legislation (e.g. ECT Act) for regulatory officials. The 
tools and methodologies were included as part of the SAISA framework.   
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The SAISA framework addresses the gaps among the role players, since all the parties 
become involved in all four phases of the framework. These phases broadly encompass the 
planning, implementation, support and evaluation of the information security programme. 
The involvement of the role players in the various stages of the information security 
programme also helps to ensure alignment among the role players.  
Finally, the proposed framework was presented in chapter 7. This framework provides the 
groundwork for ensuring alignment among the three key role players in terms of the 
implementation and evaluation of information security controls. 
8.3 Research questions 
 
The study was based on the following four research questions: 
 How can interpretation problems experienced by the role players relating to the 
implementation and evaluation of information security controls be prevented? 
 What prioritisation challenges are faced by the role players? 
 What can be done to establish a solution/delivery/measurement oriented approach 
to implement and evaluate information security controls? 
 Are the roles of the three role players clearly defined and understood?  
The following paragraphs discuss the way in which these questions were answered. 
How can interpretation problems experienced by the role players relating to the 
implementation and evaluation of information security controls be prevented? 
Since the role players are involved and interact with each other in all phases of the 
framework, the risk of varying interpretations of the information security requirements is 
minimised. If issues arise in any phase, they are addressed at that point. That is, they are 
resolved as close to where they occurred as possible. For instance, if a requirement during 
the planning phase is misinterpreted, the problem is resolved there and then, instead of 
moving on to another phase, such as implementation, without being resolved.  
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What prioritisation challenges are faced by the role players? 
Having the role players involved in all the phases ensures that they all understand the 
capabilities of and the constraints on the organisation. Subsequently, they may understand 
the organisation’s priorities on the basis of documents such as the business strategy and risk 
assessments. Therefore, when the ICT auditors and regulatory officials perform their 
assessments and evaluations they generally place more emphasis on the areas that have 
been prioritised instead of just performing tests arbitrarily. 
What can be done to establish a solution/delivery/measurement-oriented approach to 
implementing and evaluating information security controls? 
In each phase there are deliverables that are expected from each role player. The 
measurements to indicate the effectiveness of the deliverables are included in the 
framework. This ensures that the notion of merely providing the deliverable simply for the 
sake of ‘ticking the box’ is done away with. Each role player must have deliverables which 
can be measured for effectiveness.  
Are the roles of the three role players clearly defined and understood?  
The roles of each role player are defined in each phase of the framework. The definitions 
are specific to the phase; therefore the role player knows what is expected of them in each 
phase. They are also able to understand the roles of other role players in each phase. This 
approach seeks to make these roles clear for all role players as they become involved in 
different phases. 
8.4 Strengths of the framework 
 
This framework should appeal to the role players that form part of this study. The 
framework brings together the three role players with a view to assisting them in 
understanding their respective roles, as well as those of the other role players. It seeks to 
portray the role players as partners in a process in which there is transparency in terms of 
how the controls are implemented. Consequently, cooperation and efficiency among the 
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role players is improved. This is in contrast to the approach where those that implement 
controls (information security professionals) view those that evaluate the controls (ICT 
security auditors and regulatory officials) as enemies.   
The framework consists of four phases, which include the planning, implementation, 
support and measurement of information security. Throughout these phases, the process 
ensures that information security needs are taken into account, thereby providing a rich 
tool for rolling out an information security programme. Having the role players involved in 
all the phases ensures that questions are answered closest to the point where they arise. 
This means that problems are resolved early on in the process thereby resulting in a cost-
effective exercise. 
The framework produced here is flexible and adaptable, depending on the environment in 
which it is applied. This flexibility enables its application in different scenarios as well as 
different industries (e.g. financial and telecommunication industries). 
The framework ensures that roles are defined for each role player in each phase. This seeks 
to eliminate any issues that arise from the misunderstanding of such roles. The use of a RACI 
model ensures that the person or persons who are responsible, accountable, consulted and 
informed in each phase are identified. Moreover, the deliverables for each role player are 
made clear in each phase. The framework also recommends tools that can enable the 
various role players to deliver what is expected of them.  
8.5 Weaknesses of the framework 
 
As was stated in chapter 1, this framework is only applicable to the South African 
environment. For South African organisations that have presence in other countries the 
framework may be too restrictive since it does not consider international laws and 
regulations. Nevertheless, the framework can provide a good starting point even for these 
organisations.  
The framework may also not be suitable for small organisations, in particular those that do 
not have dedicated information security roles within their structure. It is, however, suitable 
for large organisations that already have clearly defined roles in the form of information 
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security professionals, ICT security auditors and the individuals who are responsible for 
fulfilling regulatory roles (e.g. compliance officers and corporate legal counsels). 
This framework has not been tested in a real-world situation, but is based on existing 
studies and work, as it is based on an interpretive research study. Subsequently, the results 
are based on the interpretation of the existing literature and may not be objective in the 
natural sense.  
8.6 Future work  
 
The study can be expanded beyond the South African environment. This could be useful for 
South African organisations that have a presence in other countries.  
The framework can also focus on industries other than primary industries (the Financial and 
Telecommunications sectors) that were the focus of this study. A new angle might be to 
look at a framework for small organisations which might not necessarily have clearly defined 
roles for information security. 
Finally, as stated in the previous chapters, information security by its very nature is not 
limited to just the three role players highlighted in this study. There are many other 
important role players, including the board of directors and the executive management. 
New research could investigate the way other stakeholders could be involved holistically to 
ensure alignment in the implementation and evaluation of information security controls.  
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